Const. Petition Nos.D-1100 & 1685 of 2013
and Const. Petition No.D-643 of 2014
Present
Mr. Justice Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi.
Mr. Justice Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar
M/s Sajid Chemical………………………………………… …………………Petitioner
Versus
The Director General of Customs Valuation & another.……...………..Respondents
Date of hearing 28.08.2014
Date of order 28.08.2014
Mr. Zia-ul-Hassan, advocate for the petitioner
Mr. Ghulam Hyder Shaikh, advocate for respondent No.1
Mr. Iqbal M. Khurram, advocate for respondent No.2
Mr. Dilawar Hussain, Standing Counsel.
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Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, J: Through instant petition, the petitioner has impugned the Valuation Ruling No.380/2012 dated 01.10.2011 on the ground that the same was issued in the year 2011 and has not been revised since then, despite the fact that the price of product in question has gone down to a considerable extent. It has been further stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner that even market inquiry alleged to have been conducted has not been placed on record, whereas the same was determined on the basis of market inquiry conducted in the year 2011, hence the impugned Ruling may be considered for revision in view of the law settled by this Court in the case of Sadia Jabbar v/s Federation of Pakistan reported in PTCL 2014 CL 537.
2. Notices were issued, pursuant to which comments have been filed on behalf of the respondents, whereas, objections with regard to maintainability of the instant petition have been raised on the ground that an aggrieved person from the Valuation Ruling issued under Section 25-A of the Customs Act, 1969 can file a Revision Petition under Section 25-D before the Director-General of Valuation within thirty days from the date of such determination of value, therefore, petitioner is not justified to approach this Court directly under Article 199 of the Constitution.
3. We have heard both the learned counsel and perused the record. It will be advantageous to reproduce the provisions of Section 25-D of the Customs Act, 1969.
“25D. Revision of the value determined…Where the customs value has been determined under section 25A by the Collector of Customs or Director of Valuation the revision petition may be filed before the Director-General of Valuation within thirty days from the date of determination of customs value and any proceeding pending before any court, authority or tribunal shall be referred to the Director-General for the decision.”
4. From perusal of hereinabove provision, it is clear that a person aggrieved from the Value determined under Section 25A of the Customs Act, 1969 can challenge the same by filing a revision before Director-General of Valuation within thirty days from the date of determination of customs value as aforesaid, whereas, it is further provided that any proceedings pending before any Court, authority or tribunal shall be referred to the Director-General for decision. In view of hereinabove express provisions, intent of legislature is manifest from the language of the under lined portion of Section 25-D, whereby, even the proceedings pending before any Court, authority and Tribunal are required to be referred to the Director General for decision, we are not inclined to exercise extra ordinary constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution, whereas, efficacious statutory remedy has already been provided for redressal of grievance to an aggrieved party. Reference in this regard can be made to the case of Khalid Mehmood v s. Collector of Customs reported as 1999 SCMR 1881, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:
“There are other matters, however, where the Constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 cannot be so readily resorted to. One such, falling in this category, would be matters amenable to the jurisdiction of an exclusive Tribunal, mandated by the Constitution itself. Another, which readily comes to the mind, would be disputes under a statute, postulating the appellate or revisional jurisdiction to reside either in the High Court itself or directly in the Supreme Court. An example, essentially relevant to the first, would be the Service Tribunal where the Tribunal is mandated by the Constitution of Pakistan namely, Article 212, thereof and where an appeal lies directly from the Tribunal’s decision to the Supreme Court. Obviously, the High Court should be very slow in entertaining disputes covered by the jurisdiction of such a Tribunal even in matters where the High Court’s jurisdiction cannot be taken away e.g. acts which are void, without jurisdiction or coram non judice. In such cases of ouster, the High Court would consider it a better exercise of its discretion not to interfere. More or less a similar principle applies where an exclusive Tribunal or a regular Court has jurisdiction in a matter but the legislation, creating such Court or forum or conferring jurisdiction on the same, also ends up by providing appellate or revisional jurisdiction to the High Court itself. Obvious examples could be civil and criminal proceedings, emanating under the Code of Civil and Criminal Procedure, Income Tax Reference, Customs Appeals, etc. In such matters, where the High Court itself is the repository of the ultimate appellate, revisional or referral powers, conferred by the relevant statute, it is in the rarest of cases that the High Court may be persuaded to entertain a Constitutional petition and to enforce the Constitutional remedy in preference to its own appellate, revisional or referral dispensation arising in course of time.”
5. In view of hereinabove, we do not find any substance in the instant petition, which is accordingly dismissed alongwith listed application. However, the petitioner is at liberty to challenge the aforesaid Valuation Ruling through a Revision Petition before the Director-General of Valuation in terms of Section 25D of the Customs Act, 1969, and may raise all such legal objections in respect of alleged unlawful determination of value under Section 25A of the Customs Act, 1969. The Director General, Valuation may consider the issue of limitation sympathetically, keeping in view the pendency of the petition before this Court.
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