Present:

Mr.Justice Faisal Arab &

Mr.Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar.

C.P.No.D-947 of 2006

For Katcha Peshi

27.10.2010.

Mr.Ghulam Muhammad Khan Durrani for petitioner.

Mr.Syed Madad Ali Shah Masoomi, Deputy Attorney General for respondents.

O R D E R

FAISAL ARAB, J. The Custom authorities seized the truck containing auto engines belonging to the petitioner and upon enquiry the petitioner was unable to show any import documents of the said engines. The claim of the petitioner was that these engines were purchased from the local market. Receipts of the purchase were shown but the same did not reflect engine numbers. It was claimed by the petitioner that the engines were confiscated by the Custom authorities and were then auctioned but the petitioner failed to establish that the items in question were part of the confiscated goods. The proceedings before the Collector Customs failed. The petitioner then filed appeal No.H-173/2006 before Customs, Excise and Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal Bench-III, which too was dismissed on 19.8.2006 with following reasoning:

“Mr.Abdul Rashid and Mr.Muhammad Yaqoob, Intelligence Officers stated that the goods allowed release by the Collector of Appeals were small items i.e. mostly accessories and spare parts without any distinction marks etc while the goods in the instant cases are auto engines which bear serial numbers and are not importable under the Import Policy Order in vogue. They also submitted statements of Mr.Muhammad Yousuf, shop No.379, Shershah, Karachi and Muhammad Jamil of Jamil Autos, Shop No.16, Shahzad Market, Shershah, Karachi confirming that they had sold the disputed goods and issued the cash memos/bills produced by the owners of confiscated goods, however, they do not possess any proof i.e. Bill of Entry etc. showing import of confiscated goods. They are also not sales tax registered persons and therefore, do not maintain sales tax records or issue sales tax invoices. Mr.Aqeel Ahmed, Consultant did not dispute these statements.

The case record and arguments of the rival parties have been examined. It is an admitted fact that old and used auto parts have been produced by the appellants. Their plea that the goods had been purchased from the local market of Karachi is of no help to them as it is a very well known fact that foreign goods including old and used auto parts or engines can be imported without filing of prescribed documents with customs and payment of taxes in the prescribed manner. All the importers are also required to be registered under the Sales Tax Act, 1990 and are obliged to issue Sales Tax invoices in the prescribed manner. The appellants should have been careful while purchasing the goods from smugglers as ignorance of law is no excuse. Their contention even otherwise is not tenable because the acceptance of the same will result into release of all smuggled goods, which are admittedly purchased from the local market and are seized by the Anti Smuggling Agencies in the remote areas during the transportation of the same goods. In fact, the penal provisions of clause 89 of Section 156 (1) of the Customs Act, 1969 deals with such smuggled goods which are seized while being transported, stored or sold/ purchased in the remote areas away from the international borders. All the auto engines also bear specified serial number as identification mark while in the instant case no serial number of confiscated engines etc has been mentioned in the receipts/bills produced by the appellants. Thus, the bills/ receipts produced are not legally valid.”

Instead of preferring appeal under Section 196 of the Customs Act, 1969 within 30 days, the petitioner has filed the present petition on 12.12.2006. Copy of the impugned order was obtained on 23.8.2006 and therefore, appeal ought to have been filed after 30 days i.e. by 22.9.2006 but the present petition has been filed on 12.12.2006 which is barred by almost three months. We would have converted this petition into appeal had the same been filed in time. The petitioner having failed to seek remedy of appeal within the period prescribed by law hence this petition is dismissed as time barred.

JUDGE

JUDGE

N.M.