IN THE HIGH COURT OF SINDH AT KARACHI

C.P No. S-1228 of 2023

&

C.P No. S-1229 of 2023

Petitioner/Tenant Abdul Ghaffar, in both Petitions	:	Through Mr. Iftikhar Javed Qazi, Advocate
Respondent/Landlord Mustafa & others, in both Petitions	:	Through      M/s.    Muhammad Naseer & Burhanuddin Pishori, Advocates
The State	:	Through Mr. Saghir Ahmed Abbasi, Assistant Advocate General, Sindh
Date of Hearing	:	26.01.2026
Date of Judgment	:	16.02.2026

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JUDGMENT

Muhammad Saleem Jessar, J.- By this single judgment, I propose to dispose of two captioned constitutional petitions as in both cases, the parties so also factual and legal aspects are same.

2.         By means of these constitutional petitions, the petitioner has respectively assailed two Judgments both dated 16.10.2023 passed by XIIth Additional District Judge, Karachi (South) in FRAs No.83 & 84 of 2023 whereby he maintained the Eviction Orders both dated 11.01.2023 passed by XIIth Rent Controller, Karachi (South) in two Rent Cases No. 682 & 681 of 2021 respectively, so also against two Orders both dated 05.08.2023 passed by same Appellate Court whereby he dismissed applications filed in aforesaid two FRAs under  Article  59 of Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984  and Section 20(a) of SRPO, 1979.  

3.         Briefly, the facts giving rise to filing of instant Constitution Petitions, are; that respondent No.1 namely Mustafa filed aforesaid rent applications against the petitioner/tenant namely, Abdul Ghaffar, stating therein, that he is co-owner of the inherited property bearing Survey No. 21, Sheet No. SB-7, in the building known as “Marvi Building”, Mochi Gali/Stalker Street, Saddar, Karachi (said property). The said property was owned by Adam Ali, Hussain Bhoy, Mansoor Bhoy, Tahir Bhoy and Nooruddin, all sons of Ibrahim A. Marvi (late). Respondent No.1 is son of Mansoor Bhoy and was managing the affairs of the said property after the demise of all the owners named above. It was further stated that the opponent / petitioner was the tenant of two demised premises viz. Shop No. C-14, measuring about 180 square feet, Ground Floor and Shop No. C-19 measuring about 160 Sq. feet, first floor situated in the said property. The opponent paid rent of the demised premises to the father of applicant for the months of January, 2006 to August, 2007 after delay on 12.09.2007; however, such rent was accepted under the assurance that future rent shall be paid regularly in time. However, the opponent failed to pay the rent of the demised premises from September, 2007 to any of the co-owners. On 29.01.2021 applicant sent legal notice through his advocate to the opponent. On 05.03.2021 reply of legal notice was received, wherein default was denied stating therein that on 20.09.2010 money order was sent and upon refusal to receive the said money order, rent was being regularly deposited in the Court of concerned Rent Controller through MRC. In   the circumstances aforesaid rent applications were filed for ejectment of the tenant / petitioner.

4.         Upon receipt of notices, the opponent appeared and resisted the rent applications by filing Written Statements. In the written statements, he questioned the ownership of the applicant / respondent in respect of the demised premises. It was stated that previously the rent receipts issued to the petitioner contained the names of “Adamali Hussain Bhoy Mansoor Bhoy, Tahir Bhoy and Nooruddin, sons of Ibrahim A. Marvi” and their address as “Adam Trading Company, Ranchore Lane, Near Bohra Pir, Karachi”. It was further stated that applicant / respondent is running M/S Adam Trading at Ground Floor, Rais Building, Bohra Pir, adjacent to Sindh Bank Limited, Karachi, being son of Mansoor Bhoy Ibrahim Ali Marvi. According to the opponent / petitioner, the opponent is the tenant of the demised premises and huge Pagri amount was paid in order to acquire tenancy in perpetuity. It was also stated in the written statements that rent was being regularly paid to the landlords namely, M/s. Adamali, Hussain Bhoy, Mansoor Bhoy, Tahir Bhoy & Nooruddin till the month of August, 2010, whereafter landlords refused to receive the rent hence money order dated 20.09.2010 was tendered which was also refused, therefore, rent was deposited in MRC. The applicant and his brother used to receive the rent and to issue rent receipt on the back side of visiting cards. According to the opponent, the legal notice sent by the applicant was replied and all the allegations were denied. It was claimed that the allegations leveled by the applicant are false and fabricated and no cause of action has accrued to the applicant for filing instant rent cases. Lastly, he prayed for dismissal of the rent applications with cost. 

5.         After recording of evidence and hearing the advocates for the parties, the trial Court decided the issue of default in favour of the landlord / respondent No.1, thus by allowing the rent applications, ordered for eviction of the tenant / petitioner from the demise premises vide two separate Orders both dated 11.01.2023. The petitioner being aggrieved by the findings of the trial Court, preferred above said two FRAs which were dismissed vide impugned judgments, both dated 16.10.2023 hence instant constitutional petitions.

6.         I have heard the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the material available on the record.

7.         Learned Counsel for the petitioner / tenant submitted that the Petitioner has not committed default in payment of rent. He further submitted that the trial Court has committed misreading and non-reading of evidence while passing the eviction order and the Appellate Court has affirmed the order of the trial Court without applying its judicious mind to the findings of the trial Court. He further submitted that the petitioner had been regularly paying monthly rent from September, 2007 to August, 2010; however, father of the respondent did not issue any rent receipt. According to learned counsel, the petitioner / tenant got vested interest in the rented premises as the same had been obtained by paying huge pagri amount, as such he could not take risk of committing default to put his tenancy rights at stake. He further submitted that the petitioner had tendered the rent to the respondent directly and on their refusal sent the rent from March, 2021 through money order which was also refused, thus he started depositing the rent in the name of the respondent in Misc. Rent Cases, as such there was no arrears for any period towards payment of rent, despite that the respondent claimed default in payment of rent since September, 2007.  It was pleaded that respondent No.1 had no locus standi to institute application under Section 15 of SRPO-1979 without consent of other co-owners of the property in question. It was also pleaded that no notice under Section 18 of the SRPO-1979, was served upon the petitioner / tenant by the new owner / respondent No.1. Learned counsel further submitted that the petitioner is ready and willing to enhance monthly rent to the tune of Rs.25,000/-. According to learned counsel, the two Courts below have not properly taken above said aspects of the case into consideration and the trial Court has passed the ejectment orders in contravention of relevant law.  The Appellate Court has also maintained the orders of the trial Court in a hasty and mechanical manner without applying its judicious mind.

8.         Conversely, learned counsel for respondent No.1 / landlord opposed the petitions. Learned Counsel submitted that the petitioner / tenant has committed willful default in payment of monthly rent since September, 2007. According to him, the petitioner / tenant could not establish valid tender of rent to the respondent in terms of Section 10 of SRPO, 1979. He further submitted that the petitioner had earlier paid monthly rent of the rented premises to respondent’s deceased father for the period from January, 2006 to August, 2007 and on 12^th September, 2007 for which rent receipt was issued on 12^th September, 2007 to him. Learned counsel submitted that neither respondent No.1, nor his predecessor-in- interest and nor other co-owners of the property have received the rent of the rented premises from September, 2007 till date. According to learned counsel, ejectment orders were passed by the trial Court after full fledge trial, providing ample opportunities to the parties to lead their respective evidence and then properly taking into consideration all the factual as well as legal aspects of the cases. The Appellate Court also applied its judicious mind to the findings arrived at by the trial Court and then passed well-reasoned judgments, therefore, the impugned orders / judgments do not call for any interference by this Court as there was neither any misreading nor non-reading of evidence by the Courts below.            It was further submitted that even otherwise this Court in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction cannot interfere into the concurrent findings of the two Courts below unless there are exceptional circumstances which lack in the instant case. He lastly prayed for dismissal of the constitutional petitions and maintaining the orders / judgments passed by the two Court below. So far as the offer to enhance the monthly rent by the petitioner / tenant is concerned, learned counsel for respondent No.1 submitted that before the appellate court the petitioner had offered enhancement of rent to the tune of Rs.20,000/- per month to be paid by the petitioner though in surrounding area prevailing rent is Rs.50,000/- to Rs.60,000/- per month but he did not accept such offer, therefore, at this stage, he being a defaulter, is not entitled to retain the premises, hence he prayed that by dismissing the petitions,  the orders / judgments passed by two courts below may be maintained.

9.         At the very outset, it may be observed that by now it is a settled law that the High Court in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction is not supposed to interfere with the concurrent findings of facts by the Courts below. The scope of rent proceedings is limited to the factual controversies. Once the issues of fact are decided after recording evidence, the same can be subjected to scrutiny only by the appellate forum provided under the rent laws. The Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 is a special law and it provides only ONE remedy of appeal under Section 21 of the Ordinance, 1979 against the eviction, and in rent cases concurrent findings of the Courts below are sacrosanct except in extra-ordinary circumstances, such as jurisdictional defect in the proceedings or there being some glaring illegalities resulting into miscarriage of justice etc.

10.       In the case reported as MUHAMMAD SALIK ATHAR through Attorney Vs. MUHAMMAD OBAID and 3 others (P L D 2023 Sindh 411), it was held by this Court as under: 

“5.       Now, before proceeding further, it needs to be reiterated that this Court, normally, does not operate as a Court of appeal in rent matters rather this jurisdiction is limited to disturb those findings which, prima facie, appearing to have resulted in some glaring illegalities resulting into miscarriage of justice. The finality in rent hierarchy is attached to appellate Court and when there are concurrent findings of both rent authorities the scope becomes rather tightened. It is pertinent to mention here that captioned petition fall within the writ of certiorari against the judgments passed by both courts below in rent jurisdiction and it is settled principle of law that same cannot be disturbed until and unless it is proved that same is result of misreading or non-reading of evidence.”

11.       In the case of Mst. NASEEM FATIMA through Legal Heirs and others Vs. Sheikh ALA‑UD‑DIN and others, reported in PLD 2005 Supreme Court 455, it was held by Honourable Supreme Court as under:

“In the instant round as well, there are concurrent findings of three Courts against the petitioners essentially involving the questions of fact. This by itself is sufficient for us not to show indulgence. Same principle was applicable to the High Court as well, which declined to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the two Courts below, not cursorily but by discussing all the pros and cons of the case in the light of available record.”

12.       In the case reported as Sh. MANZOOR AHMAD Vs. ALI AHMAD and 2 others, reported in 1986 SCMR 1708, Honourable Supreme Court held as under:

“We have gone through the pleadings of the parties as also the statement of the attorney which is sought to be utilised for the purpose of maintaining this petition. We find that the High Court has taken a plausible view and it cannot be inferred nor will such an inference be on the jurisdictional plane a ground for interfering with the finding of fact concurrently recorded by the Tribunals of exclusive jurisdiction. There is no merit in the petition and leave to appeal is refused.”

13.       In view of above legal position, these petitions are liable to be dismissed on this score alone. However, even on merits the petitioner / tenant has not made out a case for interference by this Court.

14.       Adverting to the merits of the case, it seems that respondent No.1 / landlord claimed default in payment of rent by the petitioner / tenant from September, 2017 till filing of Rent applications in the year 2021. It is now well settled that non-payment of rent is negative factor and once landlord appears in Court and states on Oath that he has not received the rent, then burden to prove payment of regular monthly rent shifts upon the shoulders of the tenant.  In the circumstances, it was the petitioner / tenant who was required to prove regular payment of monthly rent to the landlord

15.       In this connection, reference may be made to a decision delivered by a Full Bench of Honourable Supreme Court in the case of ALLAH DIN Vs. HABIB, reported in PLD 1982 SC 465, wherein it was held as under:

“…it must be appreciated that non‑payment of rent is a negative fact, therefore, if the landlord appears in Court and states on oath that he has not received the rent for a certain period, it would be sufficient to discharge the burden that lies under the law upon him and the onus will then shift to the tenant to prove affirmatively that he had paid or tendered the rent for the period in question.”

16.       In the case of Mst. Sakina through Attorney Vs. Mst. Yasmin Taj and 2 others (2012 MLD 1081 Karachi), this Court  held that initial burden was upon the landlord to prove that default was committed by the tenant and all that was required by a landlord, was; to state on oath that rent was not received from the tenant for a specific period, whereafter the burden is shifted under the law upon the tenant, who in turn, had to prove affirmatively, that the payment of rent was made and had to dislodge the claim of default, raised by the landlord, by producing affirmative and convincing evidence.

17.       Reliance, in this connection, can also be placed upon the case of Mrs. Asma Makhdoom Vs. Mrs.Yasmeen Azam (2018 MLD 976).

18.       In instant case, the respondent No.1 claimed that lastly petitioner / tenant paid rent from January, 2006 to August, 2007 vide rent receipt No. 005 dated 12-09-2007 issued by late Mansoor Bhoy Ibrahim A. Marvi. Such fact was admitted by the petitioner / tenant, therefore, he was under a legal obligation to prove subsequent payment of rent from September, 2007 onwards. However, no rent receipt relating to payment of rent from September, 2007 onwards was produced and got exhibited in evidence by him. On the other hand, it was claimed in the written statements, so also in the affidavits-in-evidence that rent from September, 2007 till August, 2010, was sometime used to be received by respondent No.1 and sometimes by his brother Juzer and so also by other co-owners without issuing printed rent receipts but they used to acknowledge receipt of rent amount on the back side of their business card namely, Adam Trading Company (Exhibit No. O/2 to O/5). However, respondent No.1 denied such fact in his pleadings.                     In the circumstances, it cannot be termed as valid tender and proof of payment of rent for the aforesaid period. Moreover, for the sake of arguments, in case the visiting cards (Ex. No. O/2 to O/5) containing receipt of amounts, are assumed to be rent receipts, the same do not reflect / contain the period of rent, name of the premises and even amounts mentioned in the said alleged rent receipts do not tally with the rate of rent of two rented premises i.e.              Rs. 900/- & Rs. 650/- per month respectively, for the period of 36 months from August, 2007 to August, 2010 thus, the same tantamount to default in payment of rent.

19.       It is now well settled that a tenant is under legal obligation to offer rent to landlord and only in case of refusal of landlord to accept the same, tenant could resort to other modes of payment of rent i.e. remittance through money order and then depositing the same in court. The tenant is also bound to prove that he had offered rent to landlord and that landlord had refused or avoided to accept the same. In instant case, the petitioner / tenant has not produced any tangible evidence / material in order to substantiate his plea that he had fulfilled such requirements of law. If any case-law is required, reference can be made to the cases of HAJI UMAR Versus MUHAMMAD FAROOQ MOTAN and 2 others (2022 CLC 1936) and MUHAMMAD YOUNUS and another Versus MANSOOR ALI (DECEASED) through LRs and others (2022 CLC 1787).

20.       It seems that in M.R.C. No.1306/2010  the petitioner / tenant stated that he offered rent for the month of September, 2010 to February, 2011 but the opponent / landlords namely, M/s. Adamali, Hussain Bhoy, Mansoor Bhoy, Tahir Bhoy & Nooruddin avoided to receive and acknowledge the same on one pretext or the other. However, he made his best efforts to pay the monthly rent personally to the opponents in presence of several witnesses to make payment of rent till the month of February, 2011 but on their refusal / avoidance, he sent money order No.02443510 dated 20-09-2010 which was also refused, therefore, rent was deposited in M.R.C. No. 1306/2010. It is now well settled that the tendering of rent to the landlord personally is a condition precedent to send rent through Postal Money Order and thereafter, depositing the same with the Rent Controller through MRC. In the instant case, Respondent No.1 and/or any of the landlords / co-owners has not admitted such fact, therefore, the petitioner / tenant was required to prove valid tender of rent under Section 10 of the SRPO, 1979. The petitioner / tenant although claims that rent was tendered to the landlords; however, he has not specifically stated that as to whom he had tendered the rent and which of the landlords had refused to accept the same. Besides, neither any particular time, date & month nor name of any of the witness has been mentioned, before whom such tender of rent was made by him and the same was refused by the landlords. Although, rent is shown to have been sent through money Order No.02443510 dated 20.09.2010, but sending of rent through money order without proving tender of rent directly to the landlord in the first instance and his refusal is not in consonance with the provisions of Section 10 of SRPO, 1979, therefore, the same could be termed as valid tender of the rent. Besides, compared copy of coupon of Money Order is exhibited in evidence; however, original was not produced in evidence nor any official of the Pakistan Post was examined which is mandatory in order to prove valid tender of rent.

21.       In this regard reference may be made to the judgments reported as Muhammad Riaz Shaikh vs. Iftikharuddin (2014 CLC 1695), Razia Sultana vs. Muhammad Hassan Khan (1991 CLC 632) and Mst. Shabana vs. Messrs NP Cotton Mills Private Limited (1999 YLR 230).

22.       So far as the stand taken on behalf of the petitioner / tenant that no notice under Section 18 of the SRPO, 1979 was served upon the petitioner by the new owner / respondent, is concerned, such plea seems to be devoid of force because during his cross examination the petitioner / tenant voluntarily added that he used to pay the rent to the applicant / respondent No.1 and his brother because their father was ill. The petitioner conceded that Respondent No.1 namely, Mustafa is son of late Mansoor Bhoy. Once the petitioner / tenant admitted that respondent No.1 was the son / legal heir of the original landlord, then subsequently he cannot take somersault and deny to tender the monthly rent on the ground that the applicant was not the owner of the property in question or that notice for change of ownership was not issued by him. 

23.       It was held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case reported as Pakistan State Oil Company Limited Vs. Pirjee Muhammad Naqi (2001 SCMR 1140) that where the tenant is cognizant of the death of landlord and he also knows the persons entitled to receive the rent, then if he deposits the rent in the name of their predecessor-in-interest, in such an eventuality, he can safely be held to be a defaulter.

24.       The main object of sending the notice under Section 18 of SRPO, 1979, in respect of change of ownership, is; to convey intimation to the tenant to pay the rent to new landlord. Once such fact has come in the knowledge of the tenant, then he is under a legal obligation to pay the monthly rent to the new owner / landlord.  Even the service of notice of filing rent cases by respondent No.1 was sufficient, as upon receiving such notice the petitioner / tenant had acquired the knowledge that the respondent was the new owner of the premises in question.  

25.       From a bare perusal of the language of Section 18 SRPO 1979, it is manifestly clear that by insertion of the words “other means” the intention of the legislature becomes crystal clear that the purpose and rationale behind the said provision is; to bring in the knowledge of the tenant the fact regarding change of ownership, not necessarily by receiving written notice but even through any “other means”.

26.       In this regard reference can be made to the case reported as RIASAT KHAN Vs. ARSHAD ALI BHUTTO and 2 others (2021 CLC 976), wherein this Court held as under:

“The bare reading of the above provision is sufficient to safely conclude that there is no bar on transfer of ownership of premises even without consent of the tenant which even does not relax the legal obligation of the tenant to pay timely rent to the known 'owner/landlord'. The Obligation to ensure information of such change of ownership is only to inform the tenant that by now he (tenant) has to make payment to new / changed owner.”

27.       Reference can also be made to the case reported as Hameed and 3 others Vs. Jitendra and 2 others (2010 CLC 561) wherein it was held:

" In the case of Muhammad Yousuf v. Mairajudin reported in 1986 SCMR 951 , it was held that if the notice with regard to the change of ownership was not served this by itself would not amount to absence of relationship of landlord and tenant. The eviction application itself is to be treated as notice and if rent is not tendered directly to the new landlord within the statutory 30 days of the knowledge of change in ownership then the tenant becomes liable for eviction..."

28.       Similar view was taken in the case reported as Ch. MUHAMMAD AKRAM Vs. Mst. ZEBA ZAREEN and others (2015 YLR 2514), wherein it was  held that in absence of any notice to tenant, the eviction petition itself would be the notice of eviction to tenant. Thus, the ground of non-serving of notice is devoid of force, because when the petitioner, being tenant, was aware of change of ownership, he was legally bound to pay the monthly rent to the new owner / landlord and in such circumstances, requirement of serving of notice of change of ownership can be dispensed with and the same shall not adversely affect the rent cases. Supposing, for the sake of arguments, even if no notice for change of ownership was served upon the petitioner / tenant; however, as soon as he received the notice regarding filing of rent case, then he should have immediately tendered the rent to the new owner / landlord but he failed to do so, thus non-payment of the rent after institution of the ejectment application, would alone be sufficient ground for ejectment of a tenant in view of the principle settled by the Superior Courts in the case of Muhammad Yousaf Vs Mehraj ud Din and others (1986 SCMR 751), Syed Azhar Imam Rizvi Vs Mst. Salma Khatoon (1985 SCMR 24), Mst. Huma Bilal Vs Gulam Farid (2005 CLC Lahore 983) and Shah Mir Vs Ghulam Hussain (2012 YLR Balochistan 148). 

29.       As regards the plea of the petitioner / tenant that without joining other co-owners and even without their consent, respondent No.1 initiated ejectment proceedings, thus he had no locus standi and was not competent to file ejectment applications, is concerned, it is now well settled that by legal fiction every co-owner of the property shall be deemed to be the landlord and competent to maintain ejectment application on any ground available to him under the law and even without joining other co-owners. In this connection, reference may be made to the case of MUHAMMAD ESSA GODIL through L.Rs. and 3 others Vs. Mst. SITARA JAMIL and 2 others, reported in 2014 YLR 1901 [Sindh], wherein this Court held as under:

“46.     As far as the filing of Rent Case No.1632 of 2000 only by one of the legal heirs of late Mst. Zahoor Fatima [landlady] and non-maintainability thereof on this ground is concerned, the objection so 'raised besides misconceived is also misleading because the term 'landlord' also covers the co-owner. A co-owner until partition of the jointly owned property is also owner in each and every inch of the property, therefore, under this principle of law a co-share can competently file rent proceedings in respect of the property jointly owned. A co-owner/co-sharer later-on, if succeeds, in the partition suit then the 'demised premises' being part and parcel of the joint property would, indeed, be partitioned between the owners/co-sharers in accordance with law. Reliance is placed on the case of Muhammad Hanif and another v. Muhammad Jamil Turk and 5 others [2002 SCMR 429], which reads as follows:--

"8...... general rule of law has been that a co-sharer can file ejectment proceedings against a tenant without impleading other co-sharers. The wisdom behind such principle is that co-sharer acts on behalf of and represents the interest of all the co-owners of the property."

30.       In the case of MOHAMMAD AKRAM BHATTI Vs. ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, ATTOCK and 3 others, reported in 2021 CLC 1405 [Lahore (Rawalpindi Bench)], it was held as under:

“Even if respondent No.4 as a co-owner inducted respondent No.3 as a tenant in the shop which was a joint-property, the respondent as tenant could not deny the right of the petitioner as co-owner and landlord of the property to receive rent or to seek eviction. In "Aftab Ahmed Saeed v. Faisal Shahzad and others" (2005 CLC 1668) it was observed to the effect that every co-owner is entitled to receive rent of the premises as landlord and if one co-owner has not let out the property, but some other co-owner or authorized person entitled to receive rent has, by legal fiction every co-owner of the property shall be deemed to be landlord and competent to maintain ejectment application on any ground available to him under the law and even without joining other co-owners as applicants if the ground of ejectment is otherwise available. Relevant excerpt of the judgment is as under:

"7. Reverting to the legal position, a bare reading of definition of word "landlord", given under section 2(t) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, makes it clear that besides person, who is authorized or entitled to receive rent of the premises, every co-owner of the premises is landlord. Thus, if one co-owner has not let out the property, but some other co-owner or authorized person entitled to receive rent has let out the property, by legal notion every co-owner of the property shall be deemed to be the landlord, and competent to maintain ejectment application on any ground available to him under section 14 or section 15 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, even without joining other co-owners as applicants, if otherwise such ground of ejectment is available to him.

31.       In the case reported as MUHAMMAD AZAM KHAN Vs. Dr. IQBAL HAMEED and 2 others (PLD 2021 Sindh 237), it was held as under:

“…in the rent jurisdiction every co-owner has a right to agitate the plea of personal bona fide need irrespective of fact that tenancy, created by other co-sharer because legally every co-sharer has his/her own circumstances hence legally shall have a right to establish the plea of personal bona fide need in respect of such premises. Reference may be made to Imran Qadir v. Roqiya Sultana and 7 others 2017 CLC Note 80 wherein it is observed as:-

"Any of the co-sharers may file a rent case against the tenant irrespective of the fact that some other co-sharers had inducted the tenant in the tenement. (Abdul Ghani v. Abrar Hussain 1999 SCMR 348 and Muhammad Hanif and others v. Muhammad Jameel and 5 others 2002 SCMR 429)."

32.       In view of above legal position, the plea raised on behalf of the petitioner / tenant is patently untenable and devoid of force.

33.       The petitioner in his written statements pleaded that he had paid huge pagri amount to the landlord. In the impugned judgment passed by the Appellate Court, it was observed, “Per opponent, the opponent is the tenant of the demised premises as huge Pagri amount was paid in order to acquire tenancy in perpetuity.” There is no cavil to the proposition that payment of pagri / goodwill does not create any bar in the way of landlord to seek eviction of the tenant on the ground of personal bonafide need or default in payment of rent; however, at the same time we also cannot close our eyes from the reality that in the old areas of Karachi mostly there is practice of acquiring the premises on payment of huge pagri amount.

34.       So far as the return of pagri amount to the tenant on his vacating the demised premises is concerned, in certain cases the Superior Courts have provided guidelines to adjudicate upon such issue. In this connection, reference may be made to the following decisions of the Superior Courts:

35.       In the case of MUHAMMAD SHARIF Vs. IFTIKHAR HUSSAIN KHAN, reported in 1996 MLD 1505 [Karachi], this Court held as under:

“In case the appellant/tenant wants refund of alleged payment of Pagri he could file suit for the recovery of the same in the Civil Court in accordance with law.”

36.       In the case reported as ABDUL MATEEN through Legal Heirs and others Vs. SALMAN BUTT and 2 others (2013 YLR 1863 [Sindh]), it was held by this Court:

”15.     So far as pagri is concerned, it has to be paid by the landlord/respondent No.1 to the tenant/petitioner at the time of handing over the vacant possession of the said shop.”

37.       In the case of MIRZA BOOK AGENCY through Managing Partner and others Vs. ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, LAHORE and others, reported in 2013 SCMR 1520, it was held: 

“But this shall not foreclose the right and remedy if any available to the appellants for the recovery of the said amount of pagri from the person who is liable to return if permissible under the law, for which the appellant may bring an independent action, subject to the law (including the law of Limitation) before the appropriate forum.”

38.       The upshot of above discussion is; that instant constitutional petitions are hereby dismissed and the impugned Orders / Judgments are maintained with directions to the petitioner to vacate the premises within 30 days from the date of this judgment. The executing Court, on completion of 30 days from the date of this judgment, shall issue writ of possession without notice to the petitioner with police aid and with permission to break open the locks.

39.       However, the petitioner / tenant shall be at liberty to pursue his remedy, as admissible under the law, for the recovery of pagri amount allegedly paid by him at the time of acquiring the possession of the rented premises.

            Office to place a signed copy of this Judgment in the connected petition.

JUDGE

Karachi

Dated. 16.02.2026

Approved for Reporting