THE HIGH COURT OF SINDH AT KARACHI

Criminal Accountability Acquittal Appeal No. 06 of 2022

Present: Mr. Justice Naimatullah Phulpoto

Mr. Justice Shamsuddin Abbasi

Appellant : National Accountability Bureau, through its’ Chairman through Syed Dilshad Hussain, Special Prosecutor NAB

Respondent : Nemo

Date of Hearing : 22.03.2023

Date of decision : 22.03.2023

JUDGMENT

NAIMATULLAH PHULPOTO, J.- Respondent/accused namely Javed Ahmed Jalalani, was tried by learned Judge, Accountability Court No. I, Sindh Karachi in Reference No. 09 of 2020. After regular trial, the respondent was acquitted of the charge vide judgment dated 29.01.2022.

2. Appellant/Chairman NAB, being dissatisfied with the impugned judgment has filed this Criminal Accountability Acquittal Appeal.

3. Special prosecutor NAB mainly argued that respondent No.1 kept entry No. 189 in the revenue record for the malafide reason and caused loss to the national exchequer; that report of handwriting expert was positive; that contradictions referred to by the trial Court were minor in nature and acquittal recorded by the trial Court was unwarranted and it is perverse in law.

4. After hearing the learned Special Prosecutor NAB, we have carefully perused the evidence and acquittal judgment passed by the trial Court. Learned trial Court has fully discussed each and every aspect of the case and while appreciating evidence particularly entry No. 189 and report of the handwriting expert came to the conclusion that prosecution case was doubtful. Relevant portion of the impugned judgment is reproduced as under:

“It may also be stated here that while the insertion of entries No. 92 and 189 were said to have been made after 1986, accused Javed Ahmed on query of the Court stated that he was posted as tapedar Gaddap in the years 2004, 2005 and again 2014-15 and lastly in 2017 when the inquiry and investigation were conducted by NAB. Even if he could have got access to the record of deh Allah Phihai being part of same taluka but admittedly he was not posted there in taluka Gaddap, district Malir in 2009 as at that time he stated to be posted in district Tando Muhammad Khan of Hyderabad Divsiion which was not denied by the prosecution.

In view of above stated facts, circumstances and reasons, it cannot be said that entry No. 189 was kept by none else but accused Javed Ahmed. Consequently, both the points No. 1 and 2 are answered as ‘doubtful’.”

5. Trial Court has mentioned the anomalies and weaknesses in the prosecution case made the prosecution case doubtful. Attention of the learned Special Prosecutor NAB has been drawn to those contradictions but he could not satisfy the Court. Trial Court has rightly held that there are several circumstances in the prosecution case which have created reasonable doubt. A single doubt is sufficient for recording the acquittal. Reliance has rightly been placed on the case of Tariq Parvez vs. The State (1995 SCMR 1354).

6. The scope of interference in appeal against acquittal is most narrow and limited, because in an acquittal the presumption of innocence is significantly added to the cardinal rule of criminal jurisprudence that an accused shall be presumed to be innocent until proved guilty. In other words, the presumption of innocence is doubled as held in the case of The State v. Abdul Khaliq and others (PLD 2011 Supreme Court 554). Relevant portion is reproduced as under:-

“From the ratio of all the above pronouncements and those cited by the learned counsel for the parties, it can be deduced that the scope of interference in appeal against acquittal is most narrow and limited, because in an acquittal the presumption of innocence is significantly added to the cardinal rule of criminal jurisprudence, that an accused shall be presumed to be innocent until proved guilty; in other words, the presumption of innocence is doubled. The courts shall be very slow in interfering with such an acquittal judgment, unless it is shown to be perverse, passed in gross violation of law, suffering from the errors of grave misreading or non-reading of the evidence; such judgments should not be lightly interfered and heavy burden lies on the prosecution to rebut the presumption of innocence which the accused has earned and attained on account of his acquittal. It has been categorically held in a plethora of judgments that interference in a judgment of acquittal is rare and the prosecution must show that there are glaring errors of law and fact committed by the Court in arriving at the decision, which would result into grave miscarriage of justice; the acquittal judgment is perfunctory or wholly artificial or a shocking conclusion has been drawn. Moreover, in number of dictums of this Court, it has been categorically laid down that such judgment should not be interjected until the findings are perverse, arbitrary, foolish, artificial, speculative and ridiculous (Emphasis supplied). The Court of appeal should not interfere simply for the reason that on the re-appraisal of the evidence a different conclusion could possibly be arrived at, the factual conclusions should not be upset, except when palpably perverse, suffering from serious and material factual infirmities. It is averred in The State v. Muhammad Sharif (1995 SCMR 635) and Muhammad Ijaz Ahmad v. Raja Fahim Afzal and 2 others (1998 SCMR 1281) that the Supreme Court being the final forum would be chary and hesitant to interfere in the findings of the Courts below. It is, therefore, expedient and imperative that the above criteria and the guidelines should be followed in deciding these appeals.”

7. For the above stated reasons, there is no merit in the appeal against acquittal. Finding of the innocence recorded against the respondent/accused by the trial Court are based upon sound reasons which require no interference at all. As such, this Criminal Accountability Acquittal Appeal is without merit and the same is dismissed.

J U D G E

J U D G E