THE HIGH COURT OF SINDH AT KARACHI

Special Criminal Anti-Terrorism Acquittal Appeal No. 61 of 2023

Present: Mr. Justice Naimatullah Phulpoto

Mr. Justice Amjad Ali Sahito

Appellant : The State through Prosecutor General Sindh through Mr. Khadim Hussain Addl. P.G

Respondent : Nemo

Date of Hearing : 18.10.2023

Date of decision : 18.10.2023

JUDGMENT

NAIMATULLAH PHULPOTO, J.- Respondents/accused namely Muhammad Shah Jehan @ Zulfi and Abu Tahir were tried by learned Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court-XII, Karachi in Special Case No. 274 of 2022 (FIR No.37/2022 u/s 11-H, 11-N of ATA 1997 registered at PS CTD/Civil Lines, Karachi). Trial Court after regular trial, vide judgment dated 23.02.2023 came to the conclusion that prosecution has failed to bring home charges against the respondents/accused and they were acquitted of the charges.

2. The State being dissatisfied with the impugned judgment has filed this Special Criminal Anti-Terrorism Acquittal Appeal through Prosecutor General Sindh.

3. We have heard Addl. P.G and with his assistance perused the evidence available on record. We agree with the findings of the trial Court that prosecution has failed to prove its case against the respondents/accused beyond shadow of reasonable doubt. From close scrutiny of evidence, it transpires that prosecution evidence was based upon admission of the respondents/accused before police officer during investigation and such piece of evidence is admissible under Article 39 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. Record reflects that though it was a case of spy information, but no private person was associated by the police to witness the arrest and recovery. However, the respondents/accused in their defence produced application and FIR to show that they were arrested prior to the registration of the FIR in the instant case. Trial Court in para-17 of the impugned judgment has clearly held that prosecution has utterly failed to prove its case against the respondents/accused. Trial Court has also taken action against the I.O and issued notices under Section 27 of ATA 1997 and Section 250 Cr.P.C. Addl. P.G has failed to show us glaring errors of law and fact committed by the trial Court while recording acquittal of the respondents/accused.

4. The scope of interference in appeal against acquittal is most narrow and limited, because in an acquittal the presumption of innocence is significantly added to the cardinal rule of criminal jurisprudence that an accused shall be presumed to be innocent until proved guilty. In other words, the presumption of innocence is doubled as held in the case of The State v. Abdul Khaliq and others (PLD 2011 Supreme Court 554). Relevant portion is reproduced as under:-

“From the ratio of all the above pronouncements and those cited by the learned counsel for the parties, it can be deduced that the scope of interference in appeal against acquittal is most narrow and limited, because in an acquittal the presumption of innocence is significantly added to the cardinal rule of criminal jurisprudence, that an accused shall be presumed to be innocent until proved guilty; in other words, the presumption of innocence is doubled. The courts shall be very slow in interfering with such an acquittal judgment, unless it is shown to be perverse, passed in gross violation of law, suffering from the errors of grave misreading or non-reading of the evidence; such judgments should not be lightly interfered and heavy burden lies on the prosecution to rebut the presumption of innocence which the accused has earned and attained on account of his acquittal. It has been categorically held in a plethora of judgments that interference in a judgment of acquittal is rare and the prosecution must show that there are glaring errors of law and fact committed by the Court in arriving at the decision, which would result into grave miscarriage of justice; the acquittal judgment is perfunctory or wholly artificial or a shocking conclusion has been drawn. Moreover, in number of dictums of this Court, it has been categorically laid down that such judgment should not be interjected until the findings are perverse, arbitrary, foolish, artificial, speculative and ridiculous (Emphasis supplied). The Court of appeal should not interfere simply for the reason that on the re-appraisal of the evidence a different conclusion could possibly be arrived at, the factual conclusions should not be upset, except when palpably perverse, suffering from serious and material factual infirmities. It is averred in The State v. Muhammad Sharif (1995 SCMR 635) and Muhammad Ijaz Ahmad v. Raja Fahim Afzal and 2 others (1998 SCMR 1281) that the Supreme Court being the final forum would be chary and hesitant to interfere in the findings of the Courts below. It is, therefore, expedient and imperative that the above criteria and the guidelines should be followed in deciding these appeals.”

5. The impugned judgment passed by learned trial Court is neither perverse nor speculative, but it is based upon sound reasons, which require no interference by this court.

6. For the above stated reasons, there is no merit in the appeal against acquittal. Finding of the innocence recorded against the respondents/accused by the trial Court are based upon sound reasons which require no interference at all. As such, this Special Criminal Anti-Terrorism Acquittal Appeal is without merit and the same is dismissed.

J U D G E

J U D G E