IN THE HIGH COURT OF SINDH, CIRCUIT COURT LARKANA
Criminal Acq. Appeal No.S-36 of 2022
Appellant: The State
Through Mr. Ali Anwar Kandhro, Additional Prosecutor General, Sindh.
Date of Hearing: 02.05.2023
Date of Judgment: 02.05.2023
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JUDGMENT
ZULFIQAR ALI SANGI, J.:- This acquittal appeal has been filed by the State through Additional Prosecutor General against Judgment dated 13.10.2021 passed by learned Civil Judge and Judicial Magistrate-V/M.T.M.C, Shikarpur in Criminal Case No.153/2019 emanating from F.I.R. No.16/2019, registered at Police Station Golo Daro for offence punishable under sections 337-A(i), 337-F(v), 504, 147, 148 & 149 P.P.C., whereby he had acquitted the accused/respondents of charge by extending them benefit of doubt.
2. The facts in a nutshell are that on 19.09.2019, complainant Saeed Jafferi alongwith other family members was available at home in village Nandho Khan Douro, when at about 07:00 p.m. accused Israr, Wajid, Sajid having hatchets, Sadique, Naubat, Naqeefo, carrying lathies alongwith two unknown accused entered into his house, accused Israr abused complainant and other family members against restriction to play tape recorder, caused back side of hatchet blow at his head, accused Sajid and Wajid also caused backside of hatchet blows at his head, his wife interrupted and beseeched accused but still accused Naqeefo caused lathi blow at the index finger of right hand of the complainant and rest of the accused too caused him lathi blows on other parts of his body; hence the lodged instant F.I.R.
3. After completing trial and hearing learned counsel for the respective parties, the trial Court acquitted the accused by extending them benefit of doubt vide impugned judgment. Hence, this acquittal appeal.
4. Heard learned Additional Prosecutor General and gone through the material available on record.
5. Learned Additional Prosecutor General mainly contended that the learned Trial Court has not appreciated the evidence in its prospective manner and contradictions so pointed out in the impugned judgment are not of such standard to acquit the accused. He further contended that the learned Trial Court has not appreciated the evidence according to principles of evaluating the evidence in criminal cases and has erroneously extended benefit of doubt in favour of accused/respondents. He further contended that the prosecution had proved its case beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt and the acquittal of the accused/respondents has caused miscarriage of justice. He lastly contended that the impugned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court may be set-aside and instant Criminal Acquittal Appeal may be allowed.
6. I have perused the impugned judgment and other material available on the record. The learned Trial Court has properly commented on all aspects of the case and has rightly come to a conclusion that the prosecution could not establish the case against the respondents/accused beyond shadow of doubt. The learned Trial Court has considered the delay of 17 days in registration of F.I.R. as fatal against the prosecution in view of case reported as Bhojo and another v/s. The State (2020 YLR Note 26). It was also observed by the trial Court that ocular evidence so furnished by the prosecution is contrary to the medical evidence and made reliance on case reported as Muhammad Akram v. The State (2009 SCMR 320). Further the trial Court has discussed several points in its judgment while acquitting the respondents; however, the points discussed in this judgment as above alone are sufficient to pass acquittal judgment.
7. It is well settled by now that the scope of appeal against acquittal is very narrow and there is a double presumption of innocence and that the Courts generally do not interfere with the same unless they find the reasoning in the impugned judgment to be perverse, arbitrary, foolish, artificial, speculative and ridiculous as was held by the Honourable Supreme Court in case of State Versus Abdul Khaliq and others (PLD 2011 SC-554), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:-
From the ratio of all the above pronouncements and those cited by the learned counsel for the parties, it can be deduced that the scope of interference in appeal against acquittal is most narrow and limited because in an acquittal the presumption of innocence is significantly added to the cardinal rule of criminal jurisprudence, that an accused shall be presumed to be innocent until proved guilty; in other words, the presumption of innocence is doubled. The courts shall be very slow in interfering with such an acquittal judgment, unless it is shown to be perverse, passed in gross violation of law, suffering from the errors of grave misreading or non-reading of the evidence; such judgments should not be lightly interfered and heavy burden lies on the prosecution to rebut the presumption of innocence which the accused has earned and attained on account of his acquittal. It has been categorically held in a plethora of judgments that interference in a judgment of acquittal is rare and the prosecution must show that there are glaring errors of law and fact committed by the Court in arriving at the decision, which would result into grave miscarriage of justice; the acquittal judgment is perfunctory or wholly artificial or a shocking conclusion has been drawn. Moreover, in number of dictums of this Court, it has been categorically laid down that such judgment should not be interjected until the findings are perverse, arbitrary, foolish, artificial, speculative and ridiculous (Emphasis supplied). The Court of appeal should not interfere simply for the reason that on the re-appraisal of the evidence a different conclusion could possibly be arrived at, the factual conclusions should not be upset, except when palpably perverse, suffering from serious and material factual infirmities. It is averred in The State v. Muhammad Sharif (1995 SCMR 635) and Muhammad Ijaz Ahmad v. Raja Fahim Afzal and 2 others (1998 SCMR 1281) that the Supreme Court being the final forum would be chary and hesitant to interfere in the findings of the Courts below. It is, therefore, expedient and imperative that the above criteria and the guidelines should be followed in deciding these appeals.
8. In view of the foregoing, it reveals that the impugned judgment is well founded and well-reasoned, based on proper appraisal of the evidence thus it calls for no interference by this Court. Even otherwise, it is re-iterated that the acquittal recorded by the Court of competent jurisdiction, would not be disturbed until and unless misreading or non-reading of the evidence resulting into miscarriage of justice is found, which has not been noticed. Consequently, there seems to be no substance in the present acquittal appeal, it is accordingly dismissed.
JUDGE
Manzoor