IN THE HIGH COURT OF SINDH, AT KARACHI
Criminal Appeal No. 346 of 2019
Appellant: Muhammad
Shahid through Khawaja Muhammad Azeem advocate
The State: Through
Mr. Khadim Hussain Additional Prosecutor General Sindh
Date of hearing: 23.08.2022
Date of judgment: 23.08.2022
J U D G M E N T
IRSHAD ALI SHAH,
J-
It is alleged that the appellant committed death of his wife Mst. Nazia, by way
of torture and strangulating her throat, for that he was booked and reported
upon. After due trial, he for the said offence was convicted under Section 302
PPC and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life, which
obviously could only be awarded under clause (b) of Section 302 PPC with fine
of Rs.300,000/- to be paid to the legal heirs of the deceased as compensation
and in default whereof to undergo simple imprisonment for 06 months with
benefit of section 382-B Cr.P.C by learned Sessions Judge, Karachi West vide judgment
dated 21.05.2019 which is impugned by the appellant before this Court by
preferring the instant Appeal.
2. It is contended by learned counsel for
the appellant that the FIR of the incident has been lodged with delay of about
02 days; none has seen the appellant committing the death of the deceased; the
postmortem over the dead body of the deceased was conducted by an authorized
medical officer; the deceased has died on account of her fall from staircase
and it has been given a cover of murder by the complainant party only to avenge
its grudge against the appellant, therefore, the appellant is entitled to his
acquittal by extending him benefit of doubt.
3. None has come forward to advance
arguments on behalf of the complainant, however, learned Addl. P.G for the
state by supporting the impugned judgment has sought for dismissal of the
instant appeal by contending that on arrest from the appellant has been secured
the dupatta, whereby he committed
death of the deceased by strangulating her throat and evidence so produced by
the prosecution has rightly been believed by learned trial Court.
4. Heard arguments and perused the record.
5. The FIR of the incident has been lodged
with delay of about 02 days, such delay having not been explained plausibly
could not be overlooked. It was stated by complainant Mst. Zareena and her
daughter Mst. Shazia Kanwal that on the date of incident they were called by
the appellant in stress through cell phone to visit his house. On such
information, they went to PW Majid and together with him then went at the house
of appellant, there they found the dead body of the deceased lying on the cot,
having injuries on her right side of forehead, eyes and red mark on neck, then
they took the dead body of the deceased to Jinnah Hospital for postmortem to
know the actual cause of the death. This piece of evidence prima facie suggests
that none from the complainant party has actually seen the appellant committing
the death of the deceased. At Jinnah Hospital, the postmortem on the dead body
of the deceased was conducted by Dr. Rohina Hassan. She was fair enough to admit
that on the date of incident she was posted at Abbasi Shaheed Hospital and was
called there from to conduct postmortem on the dead body of the deceased at
Jinnah Hospital at Karachi. Nothing has been brought on record in writing which
may indicate that Dr. Rohina Hassan was actually called by the Authorities at
Jinnah Hospital to conduct postmortem on the dead body of the deceased at
Jinnah Hospital. In that context, it is contended by learned counsel for the
appellant that all this was done at the instance of PW Majid who once happened
to be an active worker of a political party to influence the postmortem report.
As per SIP/SIP Muhammad Zahid he arrested the appellant who admitted his guilt
before him and then produced the dupatta
which he allegedly used in commission of incident, it was secured by him under
mashirnama prepared in presence of PWs/mashirs Fakharuddin and Shabbir Hassan. Both of said P.Ws/mashirs, on account of their
failure to support the case of prosecution were declared hostile. Not only this
but, they had gone to the extent of saying that as heard by them the deceased has
died on account of her fall from the staircase. The statement made by the
appellant allegedly before the police official admitting his guilt being
inadmissible could not be used as evidence against him in terms of Article 39
of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. PW Qasim Ali who is mashir to the place of
incident and inquest report on the dead body of the deceased on account of his
failure to support the case of prosecution was also declared hostile. In these
circumstances, it could be concluded safely that the prosecution has not been
able to prove the involvement of appellant in present case beyond shadow of
doubt.
6. In case of Muhammad Asif vs the State (2008
SCMR 1001), it has been held by Hon’ble apex Court that;
“…..yet there is a delay of about two hours
which has not been explained. Similarly P.W.7 stated during cross-examination
that the police reached the spot at twelve noon and about half an hour was
consumed in conducting inquest proceedings and thereafter the dead body was
sent to the hospital. He further stated that he accompanied the dead body which
was taken in a wagon to the hospital and that it took only 15 or 20 minutes in
reaching the hospital. In that case the dead body would have been received at
the hospital by 1-00 p.m. On the contrary, the doctor, who is an independent
witness, stated that he immediately started post mortem examination after the
receipt of body and the time of post-mortem given by him was 4-50 p.m. that
means that the body remained at the spot for quite some time. The F.I.Rs. which
are not recorded at the police station suffer from the inherent presumption
that the same were recorded after due deliberations…...”
7. In case of Muhammad Mansha vs The State
(2018 SCMR 772), it has been
held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that;
“4….Needless to mention that while giving the benefit
of doubt to an accused it is not necessary that there should be many
circumstances creating doubt. If there is a circumstance which creates
reasonable doubt in a prudent mind about the guilt of the accused, then the
accused would be entitled to the benefit of such doubt, not as a matter of
grace and concession, but as a matter of right. It is based on the maxim,
"it is better that ten guilty persons be acquitted rather than one
innocent person be convicted".
8. In view of above, the conviction and
sentence awarded to the appellant by way of impugned judgment are set aside,
consequently, he is acquitted of the offence, for which he was charged, tried
and convicted by learned trial Court, he is in custody and to be released
forthwith, if not required to be detained in any other custody case.
9. The instant appeal is disposed of
accordingly.
JUDGE