IN THE HIGH COURT OF SINDH

CIRCUIT COURT, LARKANA

Cr. Acquittal Appeal                        :           Ghulam Bahlol Gopang vs.

No. S- 01 of 2021.                            Khalid Hussain &Others

For the Appellant                 :           Mr. Abdul Rehman,Advocate

Date of hearing                    :           27.01.2022.

Date of announcement      :           27.01.2022.

ORDER

Agha Faisal, J.         Present appeal has impugned judgment dated 08.12.2020, rendered by learned Civil Judge and Judicial Magistrate-III, Larkana, whereby the accused/ respondent Nos.1 and 2 were acquitted of the charges under Section 489-F and 506 (2) P.P.C.

2. Learned counsel submits that impugned judgment is unsafe because admittedly the cheque was issued and it did infact bounce. Learned counsel further stated that in the existence of a cheque itself all other aspects related thereto become infructuous.

3. Heard and perused. The impugned judgment appears to have carefully cataloged the evidence and upon analysis thereof concluded that no case for dishonest issuance of a cheque was made out. The learned trial Judge has recorded that there are serious contradictions and discrepancies in the evidence and based thereupon no conviction could be maintained.

4. The impugned judgment demonstrates that the complainant claimed to have advanced certain amounts to the accused, however, failed to give any particulars i.e. date, time and place in respect thereof. It is further noted that the complainant has not even stated that on what date and time the relevant cheque was issued and or what amount was mentioned therein. The impugned judgment also denotes that the prosecution failed to produce its star witness and hence appears to have withheld its best available evidence. The prosecution witness is said to have admitted during cross examination that he do not know on what date the accused borrowed any amount from the complainant and he also do not know the date on which the said amount is said to have been advanced. The trial Court also observed that the complainant admitted in his cross examination that he wrote his name himself on the cheque in question. It is also observed that while the cheque is purportedly dated 10.5.2020, the F.I.R was lodged on 28.6.2020, almost 48 days later for which no satisfactory explanation has been put forth. The trial Court observed that appreciation of the evidence demonstrates that complainant had got no proof to substantiate that the cheque was issued infulfillment of any obligation or repayment of loan and even otherwise it was observed that since dishonest issuance of a cheque is integral ingredient of Section 489-F P.P.C the same was manifestly absent from the case under consideration. Insofar section 506 (2) P.P.C is concerned the trial Court observed that there is no proof of any threats issued by the accused and even the allegation in itself is vague. It was also observed that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses did not contain any substantiation in respect of the accusation under Section 506 (2) P.P.C. In view of the foregoing the learned trial Court had pleased to observe that prosecution has been unable to make out a case against accused / respondents No.1 and 2 beyond reasonable doubt, therefore, the accused were acquitted.

5. It is settled law that an accused is innocent till proven guilty and exoneration by a court of competent jurisdiction confirms the same. Such a vested right may only merit interference if the court below has disregarded material evidence, misread evidence and / or received such evidence illegally. Interference in acquittal ought not to be warranted merely because on re-appraisal of the evidence a different conclusion could also be possible. If, however, the conclusion reached by that Court was such that no reasonable person would conceivably reach the same and was impossible then this Court would interfere in exceptional cases on overwhelming proof resulting in conclusive and irresistible conclusion and that too with a view only to avoid grave miscarriage of justice. The august Supreme Court has envisaged a pivotal test in such matters, being that the finding sought to be interfered with, after scrutiny, should be found as artificial, shocking and ridiculous. No such case has been made out before this Court in the present case.

6. This Court has given careful consideration to the contents of the impugned judgment and is of the view that that the appellant’s counsel has remained unable to identify any infirmity therein, meriting interference of this Court. In view of foregoing, this appeal is dismissed in limine.

                                                                    JUDGE