THE
HIGH COURT OF SINDH AT KARACHI
Criminal
Accountability Acquittal Appeal No. 04 of 2010
Present: Mr. Justice Naimatullah Phulpoto
Mr. Justice Abdul Mobeen Lakho
Appellant : The State/NAB through Mr. Riaz
Alam, Special Prosecutor NAB
Respondent : Muhammad Hanif through Mr. Habib Ahmed advocate
Date
of Hearing : 04.11.2021
Date
of decision : 09.11.2021
JUDGMENT
NAIMATULLAH
PHULPOTO, J.- The State through
Chairman NAB has filed this appeal under Section 32 of NAO 1999 against order
dated 09.03.2010, passed by learned Incharge Accountability Court No.I Sindh at
Karachi in Reference No.24/2000 (The State vs. Choudhry Muhammad Sharif and
Muhammad Hanif), whereby the respondents have been acquitted under section
265-K Cr.P.C. Appeal was admitted to regular hearing.
2. It may be observed that respondent No.1
Choudhry Muhammad Sharif expired during pendency of this acquittal appeal and
appeal stood abated to the extent of respondent No.1 vide order dated
29.01.2015.
3. Learned Special Prosecutor NAB has
contended that the learned Court below by the impugned order wrongfully and
illegal acquitted the accused/respondents despite the fact that there was
sufficient evidence against them on the record. It has been further contended
that only on the basis of evidence of 05 prosecution witnesses, trial Court
acquitted accused under Section 265-K Cr.P.C, without providing fair
opportunity to produce remaining witnesses to prove the case of prosecution.
Lastly, it is submitted that only on the basis of evidence of 05 prosecution
witnesses, the whole prosecution case should not have been disbelieved by the
Court below.
4. Mr. Habib Ahmed advocate for respondent
No.2 argued that trial Court recorded evidence of material witnesses and came
to the conclusion that there was no probability of conviction of the
accused/respondent No.2 in the case and acquittal was recorded by assigning
sound reasons. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 further argued that scope of
appeal against acquittal is narrow and limited and after acquittal of respondents,
presumption of innocence is doubled.
5. In order to appreciate the contentions
of learned counsel for the parties, we have carefully gone the impugned order
dated 09.03.2010, passed by learned Accountability Court No.1, Sindh at Karachi.
Relevant portion of the order is reproduced as under:
“The plain perusal
of the evidence of five PWs divulge that in their examination in chief they
have neither deposed about the alleged properties accumulated by the principal
accused or made currency transaction or about payment of amount of tickets
purchased by him for others and misusing his official authority. The examined
PWs have neither spoken regarding the involvement of co-accused about his
property and wealth allegedly accumulated by him being the front man of
principal accused. The PWs have absolutely not produced any incriminating
evidence which reflect the involvement of accused in the offences therefore it
will be a futile exercise to continue with the trial of the accused and
presently there is no material available for which it can be inferred that they
were involved in misuse of authority. According to section 117 of Qanoon-e-Shahadat
the burden to prove the existence of fact lies upon the prosecution but in this
case the examined PWs are silent against accused with regard to the
accumulation of assets, money transaction and misusing of authority by the
accused No.1 the examined (05) PWs have not uttered a single word in respect of
accused No.1 and 2, therefore in the above state of affairs it is obvious that
the prosecution has miserably failed to elicited any significant and adequate
evidence from the examined PWs. The provision of section 265-K CrP.C indicates
that the court has ample power to acquit the accused at any stage of
proceedings even before framing of charge. This view fortified from a case
reported in 1991 MLD 298. The above provision has been inserted in the law to
prevent the prolong proceedings which apparently court feels that it would be
abuse of process of law to continue the trial when it appears that there would
be no probability of conviction of accused. The grounds argued by the advocates
of accused needs careful thought and I am of the view that if the cases are
proceeded further, it will be a futile exercise and references would not end up
in conviction even if the remaining PWs are examined. Accordingly, the
applications in hand are allowed and both the accused namely Choudhry Muhammad
Sharif and Muhammad Hanif are acquitted U/s 265-K Cr.P.C in Reference
No.24/2000 and accused Choudhry Muhammad Sharif in Reference No.24-A/2004 they
are present on bail, their bail bonds stands cancelled and surety discharged.
The proceedings against accused Mukhtar Ahmed in Reference No.24-A/2004 shall
remain continue according to law. The copy of this order shall be placed in
Reference No.24-A/2004.”
6. A careful perusal of the impugned order
shows that trial Court has discussed in detail all material evidence produced
by the prosecution at trial.
7. Trial
Court rightly appreciated evidence and held that prosecution has examined 05
material witnesses, but nothing incriminating against respondents came on
record. According to Section 117 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, the burden to
prove the existence of the fact lies upon the prosecution but in the present
case prosecution failed to bring on record sufficient incriminating material to
connect the respondent No.2 in the commission of the offence. Evidence, which
is available on record is silent with regard to the accumulation of the assets,
money transaction and misuse of authority by accused No.1 Choudhry Muhammad Sharif,
who has expired now. Contention of the Special Prosecutor NAB that respondents
have been acquitted under Section 265-K Cr.P.C, it may be observed that
provision of Section 265-K Cr.P.C, provides that trial court has ample powers
to acquit the accused at any stage of the proceedings even before framing of charge,
but in the present case, prosecution produced 05 material witnesses at trial.
Further proceedings might have been futile exercise when material evidence was
recorded. In our considered view, trial court rightly acquitted respondents
Choudhry Muhammad Sharif and Muhammad Hanif under section 265-K Cr.P.C.
8. It is also to be kept in mind that the
present appeal is against acquittal and the golden thread which runs through
the administration of criminal justice while hearing the appeal against the
acquittal is that even if two views are possible their innocence, the view
which is favourable to the accused should be accepted and the finding of
acquittal recorded by the Trial Court should not be disturbed by the appellate
Court. The reason is that while passing the order of acquittal, the presumption
of innocence in favor of the accused is re-enforced. In case of acquittal,
there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption
of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal
jurisprudence that every person should be presumed to be innocence unless he is
proved to be guilty by a competent Court and secondly the accused having
secured an acquittal, the presumption of innocence is, re-enforced and strengthened
by the Trial Court.
9. So far appeal against acquittal is concerned, it appears that trial
Court has assigned sound reasons for recording acquittal in favour of
respondents/accused Ch. Muhammad Sharif and Muhammad Hanif. Moreover,
after acquittal, acquitted accused have acquired presumption of double
innocence. It is settled law that the scope of interference in appeal
against acquittal is most narrow and limited, because in an acquittal the
presumption of innocence is significantly added to the cardinal rule of
criminal jurisprudence, that an accused shall be presumed to be innocent until
proved guilty; in other words, the presumption of innocence is doubled.
The Courts shall be very slow in interfering with such an acquittal judgment,
unless it is shown to be perverse, passed in gross violation of law, suffering
from the errors of grave misreading or non-reading of evidence; such judgments
should not be lightly interfered and heavy burden lies on the prosecution to
rebut the presumption of innocence which the accused has earned and attained on
account of his acquittal. Interference in a judgment of acquittal is rare
and the prosecution must show that there are glaring errors of law and fact
committed by the Court in arriving at the decision, which would result into
grave miscarriage of justice; the acquittal judgment is perfunctory or wholly
artificial or a shocking conclusion has been drawn. Judgment of acquittal
should not be interjected until the findings are perverse, arbitrary, foolish, artificial, speculative and ridiculous.
The Court of appeal should not interfere simply for the reason that on the
reappraisal of the evidence a different conclusion could possibly be arrived
at, the factual conclusions should not be upset, except when palpably perverse,
suffering from serious and material factual infirmities. Said accused
have acquired now a triple presumption of innocence which could not be
dispelled by Special Prosecutor NAB on any score. Reliance is placed on
the case of The State v. Abdul
Khaliq, (PLD 2011 SC 554).
10. For the
above stated reasons, we have no hesitation to hold that trial Court’s order of
acquittal passed under Section 265-K Cr.P.C is based on reasonable possible
view, this Court should not, as a rule of prudence, disturb the acquittal.
11. Considering
the facts and circumstances in wake of the above cited legal position, we do
not consider it to be a fit case to interfere it. Consequently, Accountability
Appeal against acquittal is dismissed.
JUDGE
JUDGE