ORDER
SHEET
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SINDH BENCH
AT SUKKUR
C. P. No. D – 593 of 2020
|
Date
of hearing |
Order with
signature of Judge |
Petitioner : Muhammad Janib Ujjan
Through M/s. Hamayoun Shaikh and Deedar Ali M. Chohan, advocates
Respondents : Chairman
State Life Insurance Corporation of
Pakistan
Through Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Naich, Assistant
Advocate General Sindh along with Javed Ahmed Qureshi, Deputy Manager (Legal Affairs), State Life
Insurance Corporation of Pakistan, Sukkur
Date of hearing : 15.07.2020
Date of Order : 15.07.2020
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O
R D E R
ADNAN-UL-KARIM MEMON, J: . Through the instant Petition, the Petitioner has impugned the Order dated 5.6.2020 passed by State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan, whereby he was demoted from the post of Area Manager to Sales Manager, and has prayed for restoration of his previous rank with all consequential relief(s).
2. Brief facts are that the petitioner while working
as Area Manager on probation at Kot Banglow Taluka Kot-Diji District Khairpur, in
the State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan (hereinafter referred to as
3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has mainly argued that before issuing the impugned order dated 02.06.2020 no notice was issued to the petitioner and no any opportunity of personal hearing was given to him, which is in violation of fundamental right of the petitioner. He next contended that the Respondents are duty bound to act in accordance with law but they failed to perform their duty. It is next contended that the respondent No.3 is not competent to pass impugned order on the premise that Chairman of SLICP is competent to issue such direction in the matter. At this stage, we asked the learned Counsel to satisfy this court with regard to maintainability of the instant petition on the premise that the impugned order was required to be appealed before the competent authority but the petitioner failed to avail such remedy. He replied the query with the assertion that petitioner has been reverted back from area manager to sales manager without any legal justification. He adds that due to financial crunch in the country on account of lockdown the requisite targets could not be met. He further submits that Respondent No.3, while passing impugned order, has overlooked the material aspects of the matter. In support of his contention, he relied upon unreported order dated 19.05.2020, passed by learned Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, in Writ Petition No.3109 of 2020 (Khurrum Shehzad and other vs. State Life Insurance Corporation Pakistan and others). He lastly prayed for similar treatment as meted out with his colleague and relied upon the case of Amir Iqbal Gill vs. State Life Insurance Corporatio of Pakistan and others (2020 SCMR 573).
4. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner on the issue of maintainability. There is no cavil to the effect that State Life Employees (Service) Regulations, 1973 are statutory in nature and the petition against State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan can be entertained, but in the present matter there is no question of statutory rules of service, here the question is quite different.
5. In our view, the major penalty of reduction to a lower post is a punishment under The State Life Employees (Service) Regulations, 1973 and Appeal is provided and the petitioner failed to avail the remedy on the premise that this court can take cognizance of the matter directly if approached. We do not agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner for the simple reason that Article 199 of the Constitution, inter alia, provides that the High Court may exercise its powers thereunder only “if it is satisfied that no other adequate remedy is provided by law”. It is well-settled that if there is any other adequate remedy available to the aggrieved person, he must avail and exhaust such remedy before invoking the Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court, whether such remedy suits him or not. In our view, the doctrine of exhaustion of remedy envisaged in Article 199 prevents unnecessary litigation before the High Court.
6. In
our humble opinion, one of the reasons for introducing the doctrine of
alternate remedy was to avoid and reduce the number of cases that used to be
filed directly before this Court, and at the same time to allow the prescribed
lower forum to exercise its jurisdiction freely under the law. Moreover, if a
person moves this Court without exhausting the remedy available to him under
the law at lower forum, not only would the purpose of establishing that forum
be completely defeated, but such person will also lose the remedy and the right
of appeal available to him under the law. Under Article 10-A of the
Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, for the determination of
civil rights and obligations or in any criminal charge against him, every
citizen is entitled to a fair trial and due process. Therefore, it follows that
fair trial and due process are possible only when the Court / forum exercises
jurisdiction strictly in accordance with law. It further follows that this
fundamental right of fair trial and due process in cases before this Court is
possible when this Court exercises jurisdiction only in cases that are to be
heard and decided by this Court and not in such cases where the remedy and
jurisdiction lie before some other forum. If the cases falling under the latter
category are allowed to be entertained by this Court, the valuable fundamental
right of fair trial and due process of the persons / cases falling under the
former category will certainly be jeopardized.
7.
There is a misconception and trend
that in any of the situations discussed above Article 199 of the Constitution
can be invoked without availing and exhausting the remedy provided by law, on
the ground of violation of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
8.
Prima-facie, petitioner who has
not availed the remedy in accordance with law before approaching this Court may
avail his remedy first by filing proper appeal as provided under The
State Life Employees (Service) Regulations, 1973 before the competent authority.
9. With these observations, this petition
fails and is accordingly dismissed in limini with no
order as to costs.
J U D G
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J U D G
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