ORDER SHEET

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SINDH BENCH AT SUKKUR

Date of hearing

Order with signature of Judge

1. For hearing of CMA No.581/2010

2. For hearing of main case

(Learned counsel for applicants has not complied with the Court order dated 17.08.2017).

(Notice issued to respondents)

17.08.2018

Mr. Mujeeb-ur-Rehman Soomro, Advocate for the applicants.

Mr. Abdul Ghaffar Memon, State Counsel.

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The only question left in this revision application is as to whether the applicants are entitled for the interest on the amount determined by the Land Acquisition Officer in pursuance of a judgment and decree passed in Land Acquisition Suit No.1/1989.

Learned State Counsel submits that the Executing Court cannot go beyond decree and since the decree is absolutely silent to the extent of future interest, therefore, the Executing Court cannot pass order for the payment in addition to what is stated in the decree. Learned State Counsel has relied upon the case of Karachi Water and Sewerage Board through Managing Director v. Messrs Famous Art Printers (Pvt) Ltd. through Director and the case of Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan through Vice-President I.D.B.P. v. Messrs Crystal Chemicals Limited through Director / Guarantor Chrystal Chemical Ltd. and 9 others reported in PLD 2016 Sindh 527 and PLD 2009 Lahore 176, respectively. He further stated that they have made payment over and above decretal amount.

On the other hand, learned counsel for the applicants while arguing his case has relied upon the contents of the judgment. The District Judge Sukkur while proceeding with Land Acquisition Suit No.1/1989 framed issues, and the issue No.4 as framed is as under:

“ 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to additional compensation at the rate of Rs.15% per annum from the date of the notification U/S 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, as provided by S.28 of the Land Acquisition Act as amended by Sindh Ordinance, 23 of 1984. ”

This substantially is in respect of the compensation at the rate of 15% per annum in terms of Section 28/28(a) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. While relying on the findings on issue No.4, learned counsel for the applicants submits that the compensation in terms of the findings on issue No.4 was awarded till the date of payment of compensation.

I have heard the learned counsel and perused the material available on record. The precise question is a claim of interest over the amount of compensation that is compulsory acquisition charges and additional compensation at the rate of 15% per annum. The provisions related to compulsory acquisition and additional charges talks about the payment at the rate of 15% per annum to be paid from the date of notification under Section 4 to 11 to the date of payment of compensation. Thus, the jurisdiction of the Land Acquisition Officer originates from these provisions which empowered him to grant compensation from the date of notification till the payment is realized or deposited in Court.

The judgment available as passed in Land Acquisition Suit No.1/1989 also talks about the grant of decree along with 15% compulsory acquisition charges and 15% additional compensation charges from date of notification. However, decree does not talk about its realization till the payment is deposited. These findings in the shape of issue No.4 read with decree could hardly be interpreted in favour of the respondents as the law requires compensation and additional charges to be made from the date of notification till the payment is realized or deposited in Court. Even otherwise, the decree itself shows the calculation of interest till the date of its issuance. Hence, it cannot be interpreted to be without future interest till it is realized. The jurisdiction of the Land Acquisition Officer passing the decree originates from the law which only empowered him to grant decree along with such compensation till it is realized and not otherwise. No doubt a sum of Rs.2,45,194/- was adjudged to be unpaid in the year 2010 but it was paid and deposited on 29.05.2016. Now it is to be seen whether amount of interest also paid or adjusted. One of the judgments cited by the learned State Counsel in the case of Muhammad Afzal and another v. Pakistan International Airlines Corporation reported in 2006 YLR 3074 also laid down a principle that where in the implementation and execution of a decree, the question of its interpretation was involved then it was for the Executing Court to examine the relevant record to conclude exact nature of reliefs allowed to a party on the basis of a decree framed in a suit. The relevant para is reproduced as under:

“ 17. In our opinion, it should always be the approach of the Courts of law that multiplicity of litigation should be avoided for mere hypertechnical reasons, and further while interpreting a document the Courts instead of giving effect to weight to its substance to give effective and substantive reliefs to the parties in litigation. Both the learned counsel are in agreement on the well recognized proposition of law that the scope of Executing Court is limited to the extent that it cannot go behind the decree but the fact remains that where in the implementation and execution of a decree the question of its interpretation is involved then it is for the Executing Court to examine the relevant record to conclude exact nature of the reliefs allowed to a party on the bais of decree framed in a suit. As observed above plain reading of prayer clause (b) of the decree under execution reveals that it was only the first part of such prayer, which was declaratory in nature while the consequence of such declaration was incorporated in the second part that the petitioner is entitled to pension and other benefits. If we agree to the arguments of Mr. Amir Malik that the decree under execution to the extent of prayer clause (b) is only declaratory in nature, it will mean that though the petitioner has succeeded in his prolonged litigation of over twenty years with the respondent but practically he has gained nothing out of it which obviously cannot be his intention in filing of the suit or of the petitioner in the terms that “suit is decreed as prayed”. Thus, we are of the considered opinion that by virtue of the decree under execution, the petitioner is not only entitled for the sum of Rs.46,000 towards the provident fund as prayed in the prayer clause (d) of the decree but also other lawful benefits of retirements, excluding those which were given up by him in terms of his application under Order XXIII, rule 1, C.P.C. dated 18‑7‑1984 moved before the Appellate Court in Civil Appeal No.162 of 1983. ”

Hence, I dispose of this matter with the direction that the Executing Court shall rehear the parties and adjust and calculate the amount deposited by judgment debtor keeping in mind that decree holder is entitled to claim interest over the amount decreed in terms of issue No.4 of the judgment. The amount of interest is payable on the unpaid principal amount till its realization.

The Executing Court may, however, adjust all such payment made by the judgment debtor and in case the principal amount has already been paid along with interest to any date, then no future compensation along with interest is required to be paid except the outstanding interest amount. The amount will be released to the decree holder only after aforesaid adjustments.

J U D G E

Abdul Basit