IN THE HIGH COURT OF SINDH, BENCH AT SUKKUR

Crl. Jail Appeal No.D- 79 of 2014

 

                        Before;

                        Mr. Justice Muhammad Iqbal Mahar

                             Mr. Justice Irshad Ali Shah

 

Appellant:           Shahnawaz Almani, through Mr. Rukhsar Ahmed M.Junejo, Advocate

 

Respondent:        The State, through Syed Sardar Ali Shah,

                             Deputy Prosecutor General

 

Date of hearing:  20.02.2019

Date of decision: 20.02.2019

 

JUDGMENT

 

IRSHAD ALI SHAH, J-. The appellant by way of instant Criminal Jail Appeal has impugned the judgment dated 26.11.2014 passed by learned Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court Naushahro Feroze whereby he has been convicted and sentenced as under;

present accused namely Shahnawaz is convicted for the offence punishable u/s 302(b) PPC r/w S.6/7(a) ATA 1997 and sentenced to R.I Imprisonment for life, also convicted for the offence punishable u/s 201 PPC and sentenced to R.I for three years and to pay fine of Rs.50,000/- (fifty thousand), in default to suffer S.I for six month more. All the sentence awarded to accused shall run consecutively with benefit of section 382-B Cr.P.C.”

2.                The facts in brief necessary for disposal of instant criminal jail appeal, are that the appellant allegedly kidnapped baby Marvi a girl of seven years of age, subjected her to rape, committed her murder and then put an attempt to cause disappearance of her dead body with a view to save him from legal consequences, for that he was booked and reported upon by the police.

3.                At trial, the appellant did not plead guilty to the charge and prosecution to prove its case, examined complainant Rasool Bux and his witnesses and then closed the side.

4.                The appellant during course of his examination u/s 342 Cr.PC denied the prosecution’s allegation by pleading innocence, but did not examine anyone in his defense or himself on oath in disproof of the prosecution allegation.

5.                On conclusion of trial, the learned trial Court convicted and sentenced the appellant by way of impugned judgment, as stated above.

6.                Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

7.                Since, the prosecution has strongly pleaded the conviction against the appellant to be not within spirit of law and procedure therefore, it would be in all fairness to examine this aspect before dilating any comments on merits of the case. At the very outset, it may well be mentioned that by now it is well established that cognizance is taken of an offence and not of offender therefore, the Chapter-XIX of Code has placed Section 221 at top thereby requiring that;

“Every charge under this Code shall state the offence with which the accused is charged.”

 

8.                Reason behind above seems to be nothing but that every offence’ carries its own independent punishment hence always requires its legal disposal either in acquittal or conviction. It needs not be mentioned that no lis could legally be terminated except by way of a verdict of the Court. It is a decision through which the disputes / charges, brought before a Court of law, are determined. Such verdict / decision, in legal parlance, is called a judgment’. Therefore, such a judgment’ must always provide a satisfactory answer to all claims / charges, brought before it; else the purpose thereof shall fail. Reference in this context may be placed upon case of Messers MFMY Industries Ltd and others Vs. Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Commerce and others (2015 SCMR-1550), wherein it has been observed that;

5. Termination of a lis undoubtedly is through a verdict of a court which is a decision disposing of a matter in dispute before it (the Court) and in legal parlance, it is called a JUDGMENT’. It is invariably known that a Judge finally speaks through his judgment. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, a judgment has been defined to mean ‘A court’s final determination of the rights and obligations of the parties in a case’ and per Henry Campbell Black, A Treatise on the Law of Judgment ‘An action is instituted for the enforcement of a right or the redress of an injury. Hence a judgment, as the culmination of the action declares the existence of the right, recognizes the commission of the injury, or negatives the allegation of one or the other. But as no right can exist without a correlative duty, nor any invasion of it without a corresponding obligation to make amends, the judgment necessarily affirms, or else denies, that such a duty or such a liability rests upon the person against whom the aid of the law is invoked.’ These definitions are adequately self-explanatory. In our procedural law (civil) , judgment as defined in Section 2(9) of Code of Civil Procedure means “the statement given by the judge of the rounds of a decree or order’. It should be emphasized here that a judgment should supply adequate reasons for the conclusion reached and arrived at and should be reflective of application of proper judicial mind by the Judge and it should not be a mechanical and not speaking judgment in nature.’

9.                In Criminal Administration of justice since question is always that of legal disposal of a charge/offence’ therefore, legislature though did not provide any specific mechanism for writing judgment yet have made certain things mandatory which includes disposal of offence’ either in acquittal or in conviction. The legal position, being so, shall become crystal clear with reference to relevant subsection (s) of Section 367 of the Criminal Procedure Code which are:-

(2) It shall specify the offence (if any) of which, and the section of the Pakistan Penal Code or other law under which the accused is convicted and the punishment to which he is sentenced”.

 

(4) If it be a judgment of acquittal, it shall state the offence of which the accused is acquitted and direct that he be set at liberty”.

 

10.              Therefore, it can be concluded safely that; if there is a departure from above said principle, then there shall never be a satisfactory disposal for the offence for which the accused was charged and tried rather the prosecution and even the defence would be legally justified in seeking an answer to this. It is added that meaning of fair-trial shall also fail, if parties appearing before the Court of law are kept confused of their respective claims / charges. If so, it shall be a negation to what one expects from a judgment’. The emphasis was further detailed by honourable Apex Court in case of Messers MFMY Industries Ltd and others (supra) by observing that;

“It may be reiterated that without a judgment, there is no concept of justice and / or fruitful outcome of litigation which without any fear of contradiction means that the State lacks and effective justice system. In such a situation, I would, rather, go to the extent of saying that if the Judge/ the Court does not pronounce a judgment for resolving the legal and factual issues involved in a dispute before it at all, the very purpose of the judicial branch of the State will be frustrated and eroded . If there is no judgment in terms of law, the entire judicial setup shall be rendered farce and illusionary, which obviously shall in turn disturb the equilibrium between the pillars of the State upon which it rests, resulting into serious impairment of the functioning of the State.

11.              Having said so, now is being examined the impugned judgment of learned trial Court (Judge). The perusal whereof shows that the point for determination, framed by learned trial Court (Judge), reads as under;

1.       Whether baby Marvi died unnatural death?

 

2.       Whether on 09.09.2014, at 07.00 p.m time present accused Shahnawaz Almani after kidnapping baby Marvi aged about 7 years near the house of complainant in Moro town did commit her qatl-i-amd and her dead body was also concealed by him, which was recovered at his pointation, thereby sense of fear and insecurity also spread in the society?

3.       Result?

 

 

12.              From above, it is apparent that the charge included different and distant offences, allegedly committed by the appellant, therefore, it was always obligatory upon the learned trial Court to have decided acquittal or conviction’ of sent up accused persons from charge of such independent offences. At this point, it is conducive to refer to the conclusion, so drawn by learned trial Court, in his judgment, which reads as under;

That the first point of last seen, accused taking baby Marvi touches the other point of recovery of dead body, at his pointation from the place of incident being in exclusive knowledge of accused not under the knowledge of general public or complainant party, has made out the unbroken chain, sufficiently to connect the accused in this offence.

 

13.              After forming above said conclusion, the learned trial Court convicted and sentenced the appellant as is detailed above.

 

14.              Prima facie, the appellant has neither been acquitted nor convicted for offence an punishable u/s 364 PPC (for kidnapping baby Marvi) and 376 PPC (for committing rape with baby Marvi), which is a clear departure from mandatory requirement of Section 367(2) and (4) of Criminal Procedure Code. In that situation, it could be concluded safely that the provision of Section 367 Cr.PC has not been complied with by learned trial Court in letter and spirit. By committing such omission, the learned trial Court has committed material illegality which could not be overlooked or cured by this Court.

15.              Learned counsel for the parties when faced with the above situation, consented for remand of the matter for rewriting of the judgment.

16.              In view of above, the conviction and sentence recorded  against the appellant by way of impugned judgment are set-aside with direction to learned trial Court to rewrite the judgment within 30 days, after providing chance of hearing to all the concerned.

17.              The instant Criminal Jail Appeal is disposed of accordingly.

 

Judge

 

Judge

 

 

ARBROHI