IN THE HIGH COURT OF SINDH AT KARACHI

Crl. Acquittal Appeal No.221 of 2010

 

 

The State/Anti-Narcotics Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Appellant

VERSUS

Iftikhar Ahmed  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Respondent

 

 

Before:Mr. Justice Aftab Ahmed Gorar &

Mr. Justice Khadim Hussain Tunio

 

 

3rd April, 2018.

 

Mr. Habib Ahmed, Advocate for appellant/State.

Mr. Muhammad Ibrahim Shaikh, Advocate for respondent.

 

O R D E R

 

Aftab Ahmed Gorar, J.:-  The appellant being dissatisfied with the acquittal order under section 265-K Cr.P.C. in favour of respondent approached this Court by filing the instant appeal.

 

2.         Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the learned trial Judge while passing the impugned judgment did not go through the material available on record and acquitted the respondent on technicalities without applying his judicial mind, therefore, same may be set aside and respondent may be convicted.

 

3.         Conversely, learned counsel for the respondent supported the impugned judgment and submitted that the impugned judgment is well-reasoned and speaking one and there is hardly any improbability or infirmity in the impugned judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial Court, which does not warrant any interference by this Court as the trial Court in its reasons has thoroughly examined the material and then reached at the conclusion that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the charge against the respondent.

 

4.         We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

 

5.         The trial court in its order, impugned herein, with regard to transparency or credibility of the investigation of the case has observed that learned SPP as well as Investigating Officer have not disputed the execution of documents annexed with the application in hand nor they had furnished any explanation as to how the custody of appellant was given to Police Station Maripur and it is not described in the charge sheet or anywhere that custody of the accused as well as case property had ever been handed over to Police Station Mariur.

 

6.         In the first place, it may be noted that section 265-K Cr.P.C. is enabling section empowering trial court to acquit the accused at any stage of proceedings, if after hearing the prosecution and accused that there is no probability of his conviction, where, on the evidence on record there is no possibility of accused being convicted of offence, he is charged with. Expression “at any stage” used in section 265-K Cr.P.C. indicates that any such stage can either be the very initial stage after taking cognizance or middle stage after recording some proceedings or even a later stage. It may be a stage even before the charge is framed, before hearing of the complainant and any witnesses examined.

 

7.         It may not be out of place to mention here that an appeal against acquittal has distinctive features and approach to deal with the appeal against conviction is distinguishable from the appeal against the acquittal because presumption of double innocence is attached in the later case. Order of acquittal can only be interfered with, if it is found on its face to be capricious, perverse, arbitrary in nature or based on misreading, non-appraisal of evidence or is artificial, arbitrary and lead to gross miscarriage of justice. Mere disregard of technicalities in a criminal trial without resulting injustice is not enough for interference. Suffice is to say that an order/judgment of acquittal gives rise to strong presumption of innocence rather double presumption of innocence is attached to such an order. While examining the facts in the order of acquittal, substantial weight should be given to the findings of the lower Courts, whereby accused were exonerated from the commission of crime as held by the Apex Court in the case of MUHAMMAD IJAZ AHMAD V/S FAHIM AFZAL (1998 SCMR 1281) and JEHANGIR V/S AMINULLAH AND OTHERS (2010 SCMR 491). It is settled principle of law as held in the plethora of case laws that acquittal would be unquestionable when it could not be said that acquittal was either perverse or that acquittal judgment was improper or incorrect as it is settled that whenever there is doubt about guilt of accused, its benefit must go to him and Court would never come to the rescue of prosecution to fill-up the lacuna appearing in evidence of prosecution case as it would be against established principles of dispensation of criminal justice. 

 

8.         It appears that perhaps the appellant is interested to linger on the case just to drag the respondents in this case. Even otherwise, perusal of impugned judgment reveals that after thoroughly examining the material, the trial court in its elaborate, well-reasoned order arrived at the conclusion that prosecution remained unsuccessful to prove the case against respondent and acquitted the respondents. There is hardly any improbability or infirmity in the impugned order of acquittal recorded by the learned trial court, which being based on sound and cogent reasons does not warrant any interference by this Court and is accordingly maintained. We, therefore, dismiss this Criminal Acquittal Appeal having no merits for consideration.

 

 

J U D G E

 

 

 

*Aamir/PS*                                                                                         J U D G E