IN THE HIGH
COURT OF SINDH BENCH AT SUKKUR
C. P. No. D-109 of 2011
Along
with CP No.D-2570, 2611 of 2012, 2011, 2322, 3758, 3770 of 2013, 625, 735,
1059, 1229, 1230, 1332, 1813, 1845, 2320, 2508, 2761, 3251 of 2014, 1007, 385, 551, 568, 1278, 1329, 1416, 1440,
1830, 2363, 2366, 2407, 2478, 2579, 2727, 3085, 3192, 3272, 3663, 3969, 4029,
4579, 4822, of 2015, 146,
469, 560, 666, 697, 996, 1248, 1320, 1378, 1380, 1970, 2916, 2977, 3361, 3362,
3714, 3715, 4007, 5160 5490, of 2016,
54, 85, 194, 490, 593, 660, 707, 857, 893, 943,1314, 1373, 1549 and 1728 of 2017
Present:
Mr. Justice Nadeem Akhtar,
Mr. Justice Muhammad Faisal Kamal Alam
Dates of hearing : 05.12.2017, 12.12.2017, 14.12.2017 &
18.12.2017
Petitioners : through M/s
Bhajandas Tejwani, Muhammad Iqbal Memon, Yousuf Ali, Ashok Kumar K. Jamba,
Sajjad Muhammad Zangejo, Imtiaz Ali Soomro, Shahzado Dreho, Ali Gul Abbasi,
Shabbir Ali Bozdar, Iftikhar Ali Arain, Azam Abro, Farhan Shaikh, Nisar Ahmed
Bhanbhro, Waheed Bhanbhro, Rajkumar, Zafar Eidan Mangi, Ubedullah Malano,
Waseem Ahmed, Advocates
Respondents : through Muhammad Saleh
Bhutto, Advocate
M/s Liaqat Ali
Shar, Additional Advocate General Sindh, Ahmed Ali Shahani, AAG
Case law relied upon by Petitioner’s counsel
·
Civil Petitions No. 853-K to 857-K of 2001 (Unreported
Case)
[Government of Sindh through Secretary
Irrigation & Power Department and others v. Jehan Ali and others]
·
C. P. No. D – 327 of 2001 (Unreported Case)
[Jehan Ali v. Government of Sindh
through Secretary, Irrigation & Power Department and others (“Jehan Ali’s
case”)]
·
C. P. No. D – 330 of 2001 (Unreported Case)
[Mir Muhammad v. Government of Sindh
through Secretary, Irrigation & Power Department and others (“Mir’s case”)]
·
C. P. No. D – 1132 of 1998 (Unreported Case)
[Maqbool Ahmed Khan v.
·
C. P. No. D – 1080 of 1999 (Unreported Case)
[Muhammad Murad Kolachi v.
·
C. P. No. D – 1006 of 2001 (Unreported Case)
[Khoobchand v. Government of Sindh
through Secretary, Irrigation Department and others (“Khoobchand’s case”)]
·
C. P. No. D – 780 of 2002 (Unreported Case)
[Khan Muhammad v.
Case law relied upon by Respondents’ counsel
·
P L D 2011 Supreme Court page-44
[Pakcom Limited and others v. Federation of
·
1999 S C M R page-467
[Nizamuddin and another v. Civil Aviation
Authority and others (“CAA’s case”)]
·
2016 S C M R page-842
[Indus Trading and Contracting Company v.
Collector of Customs (Preventive)
·
Constitution Petition D – 976 of 2014 (Unreported case)
[Nadeem Ahmed Malik v. Taluka Municipal
Administration Mehrabpur and others (“Malik’s case”)]
·
Civil Petition No.95-K to 98-K of 2017 (Unreported case)
[Fida Hussain v. Secretary Local Government of
Sindh and others (“Fida’s case”)]
·
Constitutional Petition No. 551 of 2007 (Unreported case)
[Nawabzada Sardar Ahmed Khan v. Frontier Works
Organization and others (“Nawabzada’s case”)]
·
C. P. No. D – 5008 of 2015 (Unreported case)
[Sikandar v.
Other Precedent (s):
[M/s. Pfizer Laboratories Limited v.
Federation of
[Agriculture Workers’ Unions,
Balochistan v. The Registrar of Trade Unions, Balochistan,
[Messers Wak Orient Power and Light Limited through Chief
Executive,
[The D.F.O. South Kheri & others v. Ram Sanehi Singh (“DFO’s case”)]
[Khalid Mehmood v. Collector of Customs, Customs House,
[Messrs Farooqui Ice Factory, Gambat through Proprietor
and 24 others v. Revenue Officer SEPCO (WAPDA, Ranipur, District Khairpur and
14 others (“Farooqui’s case”)]
[
J U D G M E N T
Muhammad Faisal Kamal
Alam, J: The above titled constitutional petitions (CPs) since have commonality, thus are
decided by this common judgment.
2. All the petitioners are claiming to be
the Government Contractors and have rendered services to the respondents
primarily in respect of civil works, except the petitioners in CP No.D-2320/2014
and 1332/2014. In these CPs, both the petitioners were
given contracts to provide / supply cooked food to under trial prisoners at different
judicial lock-ups in Sindh, by the respondents. Similarly CPs No.D-3770/2013
and D-1830/2015 relate to supply of fuel / petrol (gasoline) to the official
respondents.
3. The stance of learned counsel
representing the petitioners is that respondents without any reason have not
paid the amounts due and payable by them to the petitioners in lieu of the
services rendered by the petitioners under the respective Contracts and Work
Orders which are the subject matter of these CPs; whereas, the legal team of official respondents have
controverted the above position. Mr. Liaqat Ali Shar, the learned Additional
Advocate General, has raised the question of maintainability of these petitions
in view of recent decision (order dated 12.10.2017) passed by the learned
Division Bench of Larkana Circuit, in number of constitutional petitions, viz.
Nawabzada case (ibid), whereby, all
the CPs have been dismissed.
4. Learned counsel for the parties have
advanced their respective arguments at length and cited case law for and
against the maintainability and grant of CPs of the nature. The crux of the
arguments of petitioners’ counsel is that when the amount claimed is not
disputed by the respondents nor the work done by the petitioners,
then such type of dispute can be successfully agitated in a writ jurisdiction
by filing a constitutional petition.
5. After taking into the account the submissions
of learned Advocates representing the petitioners and respondents, the above titled
CPs are categorized into A, B and C
categories.
(i) Category ‘A’
This category covers those CPs in which material facts are not disputed by the
respondents; such as, awarding of contract, work done and the amount claimed.
Following CPs fall in this category.
CP. Nos. Reasons.
1. CP No.D-2611/2012 As per reply / comments of respondents, due to freezing
of funds by donor agency, claim amount of petitioner was not paid.
2. CP No.D-3758/2013 Balance amount was not paid due to non-allocation of
funds by Government in ADP (Annual Development Programme).
3. CP No.D-735/2014 No reason assigned by the respondents for non-payment.
4. CP No.D-1229/2014 Due to shortage of funds, the amount of petitioner was
not paid within time.
5. CP No.D-1230/2014 Funds were not released as per allocation hence the
payment could not be made to petitioner but claim of petitioner is included
in the list of Government liabilities.
6. CP No.D-1332/2014 Funds not provided by Government despite correspondence
by the then Executive District Officer Revenue.
7. CP No.D-2320/2014 Claim of petitioner is partly admitted to the extent of
Rs.636,558/- for petitioner No.1 and Rs.462,496/- for
respondent No.2. However the Government has not released the funds towards
payment of the petitioners.
8. CP No.D-3251/2014 Claim admitted. No reason assigned to deny the payment.
9. CP No.D-1830/2015 Payment could not be made due to financial constraints.
10. CP No.D-2363/2015 Payment could not be made due to non-release of required
funds.
11. CP No.D-2366/2015 Required funds were not released by the Government.
12. CP No.D-2727/2015 Claim of petitioner is admitted but the payment has not
been made due to non-allocation of funds by Government.
13. CP No.D-4029/2015 Payment could not be made for non-availability of funds.
14. CP No.D-1378/2016 Funds not released by Finance department Government of
Sindh.
15. CP No.D-943/2017 Issuance of work order is admitted by respondent, but
on account of change in administrative setup, payment is denied.
(ii) Category ‘B’
Those CPs
in which the officials / respondents are disputing the work done by the
petitioners as well as the amount claimed by the latter (Petitioners).
Following are those CPs:
CP.
Nos. Reasons
1. CP
No.D-109/2011 Claim denied
on the ground that full payment to the petitioner has been made.
2. CP
No.D-2011/2013 Claim denied on
the ground that work has not been completed and the amount of work done has already
been paid / settled.
3. CP
No.D-1813/2014 Claim of petitioner
is denied, because no work was done at the site and non-production of
measurement book. Also alleging collusion.
4. CP
No.D-5160/2016 Claim denied by
the respondents, on account of making all payments. However security deposit is
admitted. Thus, C.P involves triable issues.
5. CP
No.D-666/2016 The contents of petition is denied by the respondents on the
ground that relevant record of the Town Committee Naushahro Feroze has been
seized by NAB Sukkur on 17.11.2015.
6. CP
No.D-893/2017 Claim of the
petitioner is denied by Superintending Engineer by stating that work orders are
bogus.
(iii) Category ‘C’
There are many CPs in which till
date, regretfully the respondents have not filed parawise comments despite
repeated chances, neither accepting nor disputing the claims of the petitioners.
In addition to the above, in those CPs where the parawise comments of official
respondents are contradictory to each other, are put under the heading of this Category
‘C’.
1. CP
No.D-2570/2012 Respondents
have submitted contradictory parawise comments.
2. CP
No.D-2322/2013
3. CP
No.D-3770/2013 Evasive reply by respondents, but documents relating to the transaction in
question are not questioned.
4. CP No.D-625/2014
5. CP No.D-1059/2014
6. CP No.D-1845/2014
7. CP No.D-2508/2014 Claim partly admitted as respondents have filed
contradictory comments; Chief Engineer Irrigation Guddu Barrage denied the
liability, whereas Superintending Engineer Desert Pat Feeder Circle Sukkur and
Executive Engineer Guddu Barrage have accepted the claim of petitioner for
Rs.30,70,759/-.
8. CP No.D-2761/2014
9. CP No.D-385/2015
10. CP No.D-551/2015
11. CP No.D-568/2015
12. CP
No.D-1007/2015 Liability not
denied but only the figures / amount claimed.
13. CP No.D-1278/2015
14. CP No.D-1329/2015
15. CP No.D-1416/2015
16. CP No.D-1440/2015
17. CP No.D-2407/2015
18. CP No.D-2478/2015
19. CP No.D-2579/2015
20. CP No.D-3085/2015
21. CP No.D-3192/2015
22. CP No.D-3272/2015
23. CP No.D-3663/2015
24. CP No.D-3969/2015
25. CP No.D-4579/2015
26.
CP No.D-4822/2015
27. CP No.D-146/2016
28. CP No.D-469/2016
29. CP No.D-560/2016
30. CP No.D-697/2016
31. CP No.D-996/2016
32. CP No.D-1248/2016
33. CP No.D-1320/2016
34. CP No.D-1380/2016
35. CP No.D-1970/2016
36. CP No.D-2916/2016
37. CP No.D-2977/2016
38. CP No.D-3361/2016
39. CP No.D-3362/2016
40. CP No.D-3714/2016
41. CP No.D-3715/2016
42. CP No.D-4007/2016
43. CP No.D-5490/2016
44. CP No.D-54/2017
45. CP No.D-85/2017
46. CP No.D-194/2017
47. CP No.D-490/2017
48. CP No.D-593/2017
49. CP No.D-660/2017
50. CP No.D-707/2017
51. CP No.D-857/2017
52. CP No.D-1314/2017
53. CP No.D-1373/2017
54. CP No.D-1549/2017
55. CP No.D-1728/2017
6. At the outset question of
maintainability should be addressed. Legal team for
respondents have relied upon the case law mentioned in the opening part
of this decision. The most recent one is the case of Nawabzada (ibid). The learned Division Bench of
this Court (Larkana Circuit) dismissed various CPs, by mainly relying on an earlier decision of this Court given
in CP No.D-546 of 2014 (Fida Hussain and others v. Secretary Local Government
Sindh and others), which decision was later unsuccessfully challenged before the
Apex Court. The learned AAG under his statement dated 19.12.2017 has produced
the order passed in the said Fida Hussain case by Hon’ble Supreme
Court. The factors which weighed with the learned Bench was that in Fida
Hussain case substantial payments were already made by the official respondents
despite that petitioners (in Fida Hussain case) did not comply with the office
objection and not even placed on record the National Tax Number. The Court came
to the conclusion that earlier interim orders were obtained through collusion
and fraud; consequently the petition was dismissed. The
7. The other decision relied upon by the
respondents’ side is the order passed in CP No.D-5008/2015 [Sikander case, (ibid)].
In this case too, learned Division Bench of this Court dismissed the petition
of the petitioner by placing reliance upon the reported decisions of Nizamuddin
and Pakcom; both handed down by Hon’ble Supreme Court, and that of Indus
Trading. It is necessary to minutely examine these judicial pronouncements. The
last reported case of Indus Trading, in our considered
view, is distinguishable and does not apply to the facts of the present CPs, as it relates to imposition of
regulatory duty under the Customs Act, which was challenged by the appellants
(of the reported case) though unsuccessfully. The Supreme Court was of the
opinion that imposition of regulatory duty should have been challenged before
the forum provided under the Custom Act, 1969, which is the special law, by
further holding, that writ jurisdiction of High Court in such cases was wrongly
invoked. The other reported decision of
“It is axiomatic principle of law that every
case is to be adjudged on its own facts, circumstances and merits. If in a
particular case both the parties admit the factual aspect which give rise to
the dispute and the Court feels that the matter is of such an urgent nature
that the very remedy would get frustrated, if the aggrieved party is directed
to seek redress through alternative remedy available under the law, then in
that case it would be proper for the Court to entertain the writ petition.”
(To add emphasis underling is done).
8. Next is the reported judgment handed
down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pakcom case (supra). It would be advantageous to
discuss in brief the facts of this case. Federal Government granted a license
to Pakcom Private Limited to establish, maintain and operate cellular mobile
telephone public service and system within the territory of Pakistan for a
period of 15 years due to be expired on 18.4.2005. In the intervening period
Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) came into the existence by a special
statute, viz. Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996. Dispute
arose between PTA and Pakcom regarding the issuance of show cause notice, inter alia, for recovery of dues from
Pakcom, which latter contested. The order was passed by PTA against Pakcom which
was subsequently challenged in the FAO
No.3 of 2008 before the learned Lahore High Court and during proceeding, by consent the case was remanded
to the PTA which again decided the matter vide its order dated 04.3.2008.
Although Pakcom challenged the second order through a fresh FAO, but also
invoked the Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court under Article 199 of the
Constitution. Both FAOs and writ petition were dismissed by the learned
Islamabad High Court, which was challenged and became the subject matter of the
above reported case. One of the controversies involved (in the afore referred
case), was acquisition of share holding by another Telecommunication Company in
Pakcom Ltd, besides other contentious dispute arising out of rival contractual
obligations. With this factual background and in this context,
particularly where statutory remedy under the above referred special statute
was available, the
9. The other set of case law cited by the
learned counsel representing the petitioners is also considered, because they
directly relate to the controversy involved. The decision given in Jehan
Ali’s case (ibid) by a
learned Division Bench of this Court was maintained by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Civil Petitions No.853-K to 857-K of 2001 filed by the Government of
Sindh. The
“the learned High
Court in last two paras has observed as under:
“It is shocking to note that the payment
has not been made even though the order was passed more than two years ago. The
ground of non-availability of funds to make payment does not appeal to reason
because it is not possible to believe that the employees of the Irrigation
Department including respondents 1 to 4 have been working without receiving any
salary from the Government of Sindh. The ground given for delay is not
reasonable and is rejected. However, in the interest of justice and as a matter
of grace three months’ time is allowed to pay the petitioners claim. The
respondents shall also pay compensation/Liquidated damages for delay in payment
at the rate of 15% per annum from 1.7.2001 till the date of payment.
The respondents are put on notice that
if they do not pay the amount within the period specified above, their conduct
shall be treated as contempt of Court and they shall be dealt with
accordingly.”
(underlining
to add emphasis)
10. Similar view has been expressed and
reiterated in other decisions relied upon by the petitioners’ side and
mentioned in the opening part of this judgment. In the Maqbool’s case (supra), this Court ordered the
attachment of accounts of official respondents to the extent of claim of
petitioners. This order is also significant because both the learned Judges who
passed the order were subsequently elevated to the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
Similarly in the Kolachi’s case (ibid),
the learned Division Bench of this Court has even observed that the enquiry
conducted by the official respondents (Secretary Irrigation and Power
Department) in respect of the work done by the petitioner (of the said case), but
after conclusion of proceeding before the Ombudsman was tainted with mala
fide. The contentions of officials were repelled by the learned
Division Bench in its decision and the petition was allowed as prayed; ratio
decidendi (reasons for deciding a matter) is quite relevant to the present
controversy involved in the subject CPs. The above last two decisions from the standpoint of principle
of stare decisis (the doctrine of
precedent) is also significant, as all the learned Judges who have handed down
these decisions were subsequently elevated to the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It has
been held in the case of Workers Unions
(ibid) by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
that when Judges who rendered decisions are subsequently elevated to Supreme
Court, then their decisions are to be considered with highest consideration, if
the views expressed in these decisions were / are neither approved nor
disapproved by the
11. The well know Pfizer’s case (supra) though pertains to tax dispute and
refund of taxes and duties recovered by the Government Departments
unauthorizedly, yet the principle laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
said reported decision touches upon the present controversy as well, inter alia, due to the exhaustiveness of
discussion done in the reported decision. It has been held, inter alia, that a Superior Court while
exercising its constitutional jurisdiction can direct the refund of money if no
disputed question of fact is involved, while further observing that in a
democratic setup a Government of the day has to follow ethical and moral value
and must treat the citizens in a fair and just manner regardless of legal
technicalities.
12. When a Government through its
functionaries enters into with or awards a contract to a private party or
entity, then there is a reasonable and legitimate expectation that the
Government functionaries who represent the State will honour the agreed commitment,
unless, there are sufficient reasons available with the Government functionaries
for revoking a contract and / or not making the payments; here contracts
admittedly are not revoked, therefore, Government is bound to honour them, specially,
for the cases falling in category ‘A’ above. In view of the judicial pronouncement by the
Full Bench of learned Lahore High Court in the case of Orient Power (ibid), the contractual obligations
arising out of a contract entered by a Government functionary with that of a juristic / corporate entity has been held
to be on a higher footing than the ordinary contractual obligations between the
two private parties to a contract. Their lordships have expressed the view
that a breach of contract
complained of on the part of the State can be said to be breach of statutory obligation,
hence amenable to writ jurisdiction. If the petitioners of subject CPs,
particularly, those falling in category ‘A’, have carried out the work as per
the specification and in terms of the respective contracts, then non-payment of
their admitted claims by the respondents is wholly unjustified and illegal. It
is in fact not only a blatant breach of contract by official respondents but this
act is violative of Article 18 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of
Pakistan, which guarantees freedom of trade, business and profession. Similarly
these acts of official respondents also impinge upon the fundamental rights of
petitioners as enshrined in Article 24 of the Constitution relating to the
property rights. The term ‘property’ as contained in Article 24 has been
defined in Article 260 of the Constitution itself, which includes any right,
title or interest in property, moveable and immoveable. Therefore, if a
monetary claim of a person, in the instant case, the petitioners of category ‘A’ are not disputed by the officials (respondents), but
still remain unpaid, then this amounts to depriving the petitioners from their
moveable properties.
13. To further supplement the above
discussion, two reported judgments of our Supreme Court in Airport Services and
Khalid Mehmood cases (supra) have
expounded the availability of alternate and efficacious remedy vis-à-vis bar of
jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution. The crux of the principle
laid down in these cases is that even availability / existence of an adequate,
alternate remedy can not operate as an absolute bar for invoking the writ
jurisdiction of High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution. It would be
advantageous to reproduce the relevant portion of the judgments herein under:
“Neither of the conclusions of
the High Court is sustainable. It has consistently been held that while routine
contractual disputes between private parties and public functionaries are not
open to scrutiny under the Constitutional jurisdiction, breaches of such contracts,
which do not entail inquiry into or examination of minute or controversial
questions of fact, if committed by Government, semi-Government or Local Authorities
or like controversies if involving
dereliction of obligations, flowing from a statute, rules or instructions can adequately
be addressed for relief under that jurisdiction. Further a contract,
carrying elements of public interest, concluded by functionaries of the State,
has to be just, fair, transparent, reasonable and free of any taint of mala fides, all such aspects remaining open
for judicial review. The rule is founded on the premises that public
functionaries, deriving authority from or under law, are obligated to act
justly, fairly equitably, reasonably, without any element of discrimination and
squarely within the parameters of law, as applicable in a given situation.
Deviations, if of substance, can be corrected through appropriate orders under
Article 199 of the Constitution. In such behalf even where a contract, pure
and simple, is involved, provided always that public element presents itself and the dispute does not
entail evidentiary facts of a disputed nature, rederess may be provided…..”.
[1998 SCMR
2268]
(To add emphasis underling is done).
“Of such alternative remedies
also there are some, which would still leave the jurisdiction of the High Court
virtually unaffected, if the order, complained of, is so patently illegal, void
or wanting in jurisdiction that any further recourse to or prolongation of the
alternative remedy may only be counter-productive and, by invocation of Article
199 the mischief can forthwith be nipped in the bud. In such matters, of
course, neither the alternative remedy would be adequate nor bar of
jurisdiction in the Sub-Constitutional Legislation may come in the way of the
High Court in exercising its Constitutional jurisdiction.”
[1999 SCMR 1881]
In a
subsequent reported decision in Farooqui’s case (supra), the learned Division Bench of this Court disagreed with
the arguments of respondents, inter alia,
about alternate remedy available under the Regulation of Generation
Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act 1997, while holding that to
apply strictly the concept of alternate remedy, the Courts had to see that whether
the said remedy is adequate and efficacious also. The relevant portion
of the judgment is reproduced herein under:
“In view of principle, laid down
in the above case, we observe that the alternate remedy ought to be adequate,
that is to say, promptitude may be there and if it is not so, High Court can
issue appropriate writ. This being so, we observe that the writ petitions are
maintainable, in that, the alternate remedy rests upon a lengthy procedure.”
To sum up the
above in few words, a reported decision of Indian Supreme Court handed down in
DFO’s case (supra) must be mentioned
here together with the reproduction of its relevant portion_
“We
are unable to hold that merely because the source of the right which the
respondent claims was initially in a contract, for obtaining relief against any
arbitrary and un-lawful action on the part of a public authority he must resort
to a suit and not to a petition by way of a writ. In view of the judgment of
this Court in K. N. Guruswamy’s case, (1955) 1 SCR 305=(AIR 1954 SC 592)
there can be no doubt that the petition was maintainable, even if the right to
relief arose out of an alleged breach of contract, where the action challenged
was of a public authority invested with statutory power.”
(underlined to supply
emphasis).
14. The objective of law is to ensure an orderly behaviour in a
society and if on one hand a wrongful act is left unattended on the basis of
certain technicalities and on the other hand a victim of wrongful act is left
to run from pillar to post, then in due course of time, an orderly system of a
society would be diminished and will be replaced by a disorderly and intolerant
behaviour as well as lawlessness.
15. For the above
reasons we deemed it appropriate to categorize the subject CPs. The dicta of
the reported judgments cited by the petitioners are applicable to the subject
CPs falling in category ‘A’, wherein respective claims of petitioners have not
been refuted by the respondents and therefore these petitions are to be
accepted. Thus, the arguments of the legal team of the respondents to the
extent of subject CPs falling in category ‘A’ have no merits.
. Issues involved here are of peculiar
nature as discussed herein above, inter
alia, concerning the fundamental right(s) of a citizen / Petitioners, which
indeed is a very serious one and must be remedied at the earliest.
16. Considering
the cases of petitioners whose claims are not disputed by the respondents /
officials, in our view it would be unjust to direct those petitioners to go
through another round of litigation in the shape of civil suits. Even, in the
Indus Trading case (ibid) the Hon’ble
Supreme Court considered the hardship factor favourably.
17. The
upshot of the above is that CPs falling in category ‘A’
are accepted and the respondents are directed to pay the undisputed monetary
claims of petitioners within two weeks from today, but after completing the
codal formalities.
18. As a sequel to the above discussion, and by
following the rule mentioned in the recent judgment of this Court in Nawabzada’s
case (supra), the subject CPs
falling in category ‘B” are dismissed, because the claims of respective
petitioners of this category of CPs have been disputed by the official
respondents. However, all the petitioners will be at liberty to avail their remedy,
if any, before the proper forum in accordance with law.
19. For the CPs mentioned under the heading
of category ‘C’, we deem it appropriate that the respective claims of
petitioners should first be scrutinized, examined and finalized by the concerned
Departments / officials respondents within four (04) weeks from today and if
the same are found to be correct and genuine then the monetary claims of the
respective petitioners of CPs falling under category ‘C’ should be settled
within two (02) weeks, as per their entitlement and subject to the above
directions and after completing codal formalities.
20. In view of the above, all
the subject CPs stand disposed of.
JUDGE
JUDGE
Suleman Khan/PA